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1. EXECUITIVE SUMMARY
The building of interest for this project is the Construction Innovation Center (CIC) at California 
Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. The CIC consists of 3 structures (buildings A, B, and C) 
equipped throughout with a wet pipe automatic sprinkler system and a fire alarm system with smoke 
detection. This report reviews the prescriptive and performance-based requirements along with providing a 
fire safety management plan. The prescriptive based portion of this report covers egress, fire alarm, 
automatic fire sprinklers, flammability, and structural fire protection requirements. Upon completion of the 
prescriptive code analysis comparing the CIC to the 2015 International Building Code (IBC), the buildings 
were found to comply with the code requirements with a few exceptions.  
The flammability analysis lists out the requirements for interior finishes permitted under the 2015 
IBC. No detailed description was provided of the interior finishes so it could not be verified if the interior 
finish of the building meets the code requirement.  
The automatic sprinkler system installed was found to comply with the NFPA 13 requirements for 
occupancy classification (light, and ordinary hazard), sprinkler spacing, and water supply requirements. 
Hydraulic calculations were performed to verify that the water supply from the San Luis Obispo public 
water main was adequate for the system demand in the hydraulically most challenging areas of the CIC. 
Based on the water flow test from 2002, it was found that the water available as well as the pressure 
requirements are adequate for the automatic sprinkler system of the CIC without the need for an additional 
water supply and/or a fire pump. The inspection, testing and maintenance requirements from NFPA 25 are 
also summarized.  
The egress components of the CIC were found to comply with the requirements of the IBC for 
occupant loading, common path of travel, travel distance, and exit component width. The occupants of 
building B are not provided with their own stairwell and are reliant on the stairwell of buildings A and C 
for egress. By splitting the occupants of building B, the exit widths are within code requirements.  However, 
when adding the Simpson High Bay (SHB) to the analysis, the capacity of the stairwell associated with CIC 
building C is exceeded. The SHB drawings obtained shows the mezzanine of the SHB connected to the 
second floor of the CIC and using the CIC for egress. The occupant load for the mezzanine is shown to be 
43 people. The SHB is provided with another exit not connected to the CIC, but the CIC has the capacity 
for the additional occupant load provided that all of the SHB occupants use the stairwell of building A.  
The fire alarm system provides smoke detection throughout the building which is not required by 
the IBC. The one item which is questionable if it meets the code requirements is the sound pressure level 
within the offices in building A of the CIC. Hand calculations (based on SFPE Handbook) where performed 
that indicates the sound pressure level is below the 70dBA requirement per NFPA 72. The hand calculations 
made several assumptions on building materials which greatly impact the results. This not of great concern 
as another horn could be added to the notification circuit if testing finds areas below the audibility 
requirement of NFPA 72. The largest problem or question comes from determining if all the buildings on 
the site comply with the 2007 version of the California Building Code (CBC).  
The CIC was built under the 2001 edition of the CBC as three separate buildings while the drawings 
of the SHB (built under the 2007 edition of the CBC) indicate that the CIC and the SHB were considered 
as one building. This would require that the CIC be updated to comply with the 2007 edition of the CBC. 
This needs to be verified; however, the as-built drawings of the SHB were not obtained so there could be 
changes/differences not included in this report.  






 The structural code analysis provides the building materials used and details the fire resistance 
ratings required for the building. The CIC is identified as Type IIB construction which allows for none of 
the structural members to be fire rated. The only fire rated walls throughout the CIC are for vertical shafts, 
including mechanical and elevator shafts, and 2-hour wall separating building B from building C. This 2-
hour wall is provided as it was required under the original building code of the CIC. The original building 
code of the CIC had a much smaller allowable area for Type IIB construction than newer editions of the 
building code. To allow for the buildings to be considered separate buildings the 2-hour fire wall was 
provided.    
 The performance-based design review was accomplished with several design fires to represent 
several different NFPA 101 design fire scenarios. Design fires in a lecture room of building C, corridor of 
building A, conference room in building A, and in the adjacent SHB are discussed. A combined/final heat 
release rate curve was found for all the design fires, but only the SHB design fire was modeled in detail 
including computer modeling. The remaining design fires are discussed in enough detail where computer 
modeling verify the hand calculations and be based upon other reported information.  
 The lecture room and corridor design fire if modeled with FDS would look at the tenability criteria 
of the occupants within the room/corridor as well as how the occupants in the corridor could possibly be 
affected. Several different ventilation factors would account for door openings, and windows breaking. 
More tenability criteria would need to be identified such as visibility.  
 If the conference room design fire was modeled further, a structural engineer would most likely 
need to be consulted. The exposed structural members within the space could be analyzed using 
temperatures from FDS for the boundary conditions in SAIFR. However, failure of the structural members 
within the space could not affect the occupants within the CIC. If the redundant structural elements are 
sized appropriately structural integrity could still be maintained allowing for safe occupant evacuation and 
repair of the structure after a fire.  
 The results of the SHB design fire assumed an opening was present from the time of ignition of the 
fire to account for the possibility the glass on the SHB breaking and a fire plum affecting the SHB. The 
criteria the fire was modeled against was the tenability of the occupants in building B. The occupants in 
building B are not provided with their own stairwell and are reliant upon building A and C’s stairs. Thus, 
they are exposed to the hazards of a fire in the SHB. The tenability criteria selected was a 120°C 
temperature, 3,000 ppm CO concentration, visibility of 10 meters, and a heat flux of 2.5kW/m2. Only the 
visibility criteria were exceeded during the FDS simulation. The visibility was found to reach 10m at the 
edge of the 3rd story balcony of the CIC at 1238 seconds.  
 Egress modeling was completed using both hand calculations and a computer model for total 
building evacuation. Hand calculations were based upon the SFPE handbook method and were performed 
for no exit stairs being blocked and one exit stair being blocked. The hand-calculated exit time was found 
to be 10 and 11 minutes respectively. The computer-based evacuation model used Mass Motion. The results 
of the computer model were within 1 minute of the results from the hand calculation (not including the 
applied factor of safety for either method). The Mass Motion model found a total building evacuation time 
of 10 minutes which was the most onerous scenario out of the 25 times the model was run. Results in Mass 
Motion can vary so the model was run multiple times for statistical significance. The resulting factor of 
safety was found to be 1.8 with an RSET of 11 minutes and a 20min (1238s) ASET. 






 The fire safety management plan provided is intended to be a stand along document to be provided 
to the building owner or facilities operator to provide a brief summary of what is installed throughout the 
building and the requirements of the CIC under the 2015 edition of the IBC.  
 Upon reviewing the fire protection of the CIC, it is recommended that a fire alarm test be conducted, 
and a more in-depth historical code review be completed.  The fire alarm test should verify if Buildings A, 
B, C, and the SHB are connected as in if a detector is activated in building A will it notify occupants in all 
the other structures. Then the second reason for the fire alarm test is to verify that the audibility requirements 
are met throughout the building.  The recommendation for a in depth historical code review should be 
completed as there may be an instance with the SHB addition that the CIC does not comply with the original 











2. CODES AND STANDARDS 
 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA): 
 
• NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, 2013 edition 
• NPFA 13, Standard for Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2013 edition 
• NFPA 14, Standard for the installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems, 2013 edition 
• NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection 
Systems, 2011 edition 
• NFPA 72, National Fire alarm and Signaling Code, 2013 edition 
• NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2012 edition 
International Code Council: 
• International Building Code (IBC), 2015 edition 
• International Fire Code (IFC), 2015 edition 
• International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC), 2015 edition 
 
3. CODE OVERVIEW 
 
 The Construction Innovation Center (CIC) was analyzed using the 2015 edition of the International 
Building Code (IBC) and an overview in Section 3.1 will discuss in broad terms the characteristics of the 
building. For an explanation of the historic code please refer to Section 3.2 of this report. 
3.1. 2015 IBC Overview 
 The CIC is classified as a class B occupancy according to Section 303.1.1 and 305.1 of the 
International Building Code (IBC). Section 305.1 states that educational group occupancy only applies to 
spacing being occupied for educational purposes up to the 12th grade [1]. This building is for college 
educational purposes which brings the need for Section 303.1.1 of the IBC. 303.1.1 of the IBC states that a 
building used for assembly purposes with an occupant load less than 50 people will be classified as group 
B occupancy [1].  
 The building is provided throughout with a proprietary supervising station alarm system which is 
monitored by the Cal Poly campus police department. The detection devices are Notifier devices, and the 
notification devices are Gentex.  
 This building is technically 3 structures which are connected and considered one building per the 
building code. All three buildings A, B, and C are three stories in height and can be seen in Figure 1 below 
showing a google earth screenshot.  
 
 







Figure 1. Labeled Aerial view of the CIC Buildings A, B, and C and the Simpson High Bay [2]. 
 The floor usage in buildings A, B and C are nearly identical between floors so only the 2nd floor 
with the different types of usages will be shown below in Figures 2-4. Building A has the most significant 
changes as it is used for faculty offices which have slightly different configurations on each floor. For all 
floor plan drawings showing the space usage see Appendix A. 
  










Figure 2. Second floor of buildings B and C of the CIC. Space usages have been color-coded and a legend provided in the Figure 
to show what each space is used for. 
 The areas with the largest number of people in one space throughout the entire building is in 
buildings B and C. The largest classrooms are present in these Sections of the building. There is a total of 
three exit stairs throughout the CIC, however building B relies on the stairs that are present in building A 
and C for egress. The color-coded drawing showing the space use for building A on the second floor can 
be seen in Figure 3 and a total color-coded overview of the entire 2nd floor of the CIC can be seen in Figure 
4. 







Figure 3. Second floor of building A of the CIC. Space usages have been color-coded and a legend provided in the Figure to 
show what each space is used for. 
 
 
Figure 4. Overview of entire CIC on the 2nd floor. The second floor is adequate as all the floors are similar in room layout, usage, 
and exit corridors. The first floor being on the ground level is the largest difference. 
 The occupancies in the CIC vary and a list of the usages can be seen below along with the legend 
present in the occupancy Figure 2-4 above. 







2. Janitor closets 
3. Mechanical rooms 
4. Electrical rooms 
5. Bathrooms 
6. I.D.F. rooms 
7. Offices 
8. Conference rooms 
9. Elevators 
 The occupancies of this building do not produce any major unforeseen hazards that are not normally 
associated with these occupancies.  The most notable hazards present within the building itself are projects 
made in classrooms, and furniture present throughout the building. The egress for building B is a concern 
as there are only 3 sets of stairs (can be seen in Figure 4) and none of which are located within building B.  
This can be problematic due to the proximity of building B to the Simpson High Bay (SHB). The SHB is 
used for construction projects where small-scale buildings are produced and if one of these buildings 
catches on fire the incident heat flux on the CIC could become problematic. The proximity of the buildings 









Figure 5. Pictures showing the proximity of the SHB to building B of the CIC 
 







A) Typical projects in SHB B) Open SHB bay Doors 
 
Figure 6. A) Pictures of the typical project that can be present in the SHB at any time. These projects are for students to build 
small structures like large scale structures with the same materials present. So, some of the finished projects could be treated as a 
small house. B) Is a photo of the large open doors to the SHB which would make the structure most likely not able to reach 
flashover due to the large ventilation condition.  
 
3.2. Historic Code Overview 
 The CIC was originally built under the 2001 California Building Code (CBC) which was modified 
from the 1997 uniform building code. The CIC from the code perspective appears to have been designed 
as three separate buildings due to limitation on area in the 2001 CBC. Originally, Type IIB construction 
was limited to 12,000sqft with area increases for frontage on 2 sides up to 50% increase (bringing allowable 
area to 18,000sqft per building). Building A and B have greater than 10ft of separation and therefore were 
not required to provide an exterior fire resistance rating, while a 2-hour fire resistance rating was required 
between building B and C in order to call them separate buildings to meet the area limitation.  
 Later the SHB was built using the 2007 California Building Code (planning started 2006 and 
construction was completed in 2011). This edition of the code allowed for a greater maximum area for Type 
IIB buildings. All four of the structures the CIC A, B, C and the SHB were considered as one single building 
meeting the area requirements of the code and therefore no exterior fire resistance or separation requirement 
was required from the CIC to the SHB.  
 No documentation was provided to show that the CIC was updated to meet the 2007 California 
Building Code to meet this requirement. 
 Using the 2015 IBC all of the structures can be classified as one building on the same lot per 
§503.2.1. 
 
 The historic code Section from the 2001 California Building Code can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 






4. PRESCRIPTIVE BASED DESIGN 
 
 This Section of the report will be discussing the prescriptive based requirements for the CIC and 
how the building meets these requirements. The topics which will be discussed include, egress, fire alarm, 
water-based fire suppression, and structural. The requirements being used were taken from the IBC. 
4.1. Egress 
 In the egress Section of the prescriptive based analysis, the occupant loads will be discussed first 
as they are needed to determine the required exit capacity and sizing. Then the fire-resistance ratings and 
interior finish requirements will be discussed for exit corridors along with exit sign placement. This Section 
of this report reflects the requirements found in Chapter 10 of the IBC. 
4.1.1. Occupant Loads 
The occupant load was calculated in accordance with the IBC. The occupant load factors used for 
this building can be seen in the Table 1 below. 







Business Area 100 gross [ft2/persons] 
Education Classroom 20 net [ft2/persons] 
Educational, Shops 
and Other Vocational 
Areas 
50 net [ft2/persons] 
The difference between gross area and net area must be discussed as this area difference greatly 
affects the calculated occupancy load. Gross area considers all the area of a space within the perimeter walls 
of the building and the adjacent spaces used for accessory purposes (i.e. bathrooms, corridors etc.) exclusive 
of ventilation shafts and courts. The net floor area does not include unoccupied accessory areas such as 
corridors, stairways, bathrooms, mechanical rooms, and closets. 
The occupant load was found by multiplying the respective gross and net areas by the occupant 
load factor in Table 1 to find the occupant load in each space. If the resulting number of people calculated 
was not an integer the number of occupants was rounded up to the next whole number as you cannot have 
a portion of a person. A summary of the results can be seen in the Table 2 below and all the results for the 
individual occupant loads for each space can be seen in Appendix B. The summary of the occupant loads 
overlain on the drawings is shown in Appendix D. 
  



































1 3,347 41 1,913 39 n/a n/a 
2 4,384 55 1,998 40 n/a n/a 
3 3,581 46 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Basement n/a n/a n/a n/a 2,258 0 
B 
1 n/a n/a 6,350 128 n/a n/a 
2 n/a n/a 6,347 129 n/a n/a 
3 n/a n/a 6,440 131 n/a n/a 
C 
1 n/a n/a 2,696 138 n/a n/a 
2 n/a n/a 2,499 127 n/a n/a 
3 n/a n/a 2,642 134 n/a n/a 
Total n/a 11,312 142 31,158 866 2,258 0 
 
 
4.1.2. Exit Capacity and Sizing 
The exit capacities for each floor and space were also verified against the requirements set out in 
the 2015 IBC. All spaces were found to comply with the door width requirements along with the number 
of exits required in each space. The number of exits required for each space was determined using IBC 
Table 1006.2.1 and Section 1006.2.1 which shows the maximum occupant load based upon occupancy for 
a single exit and the number of exits required based upon the number of occupants, respectively. These are 
shown in Table 3 and 4, respectively. 
 
Table 3. Maximum occupant load for a space based upon the occupancy group for a space to have a single exit. Based upon 
Table 1006.2.1 of the IBC. 
Occupancy 
Maximum Occupant 
Load for Single Exit 
Group B 49 
 
Table 4. Number of exits required based upon the number of occupants per space. If the number of occupants is below 500 and 
below the number of occupants presented in Table 2 a single exit can be used otherwise the required number of exits for a space 
must comply with this Table as in accordance with Section 1006.2.1 of the IBC. 
Number of Occupants Number of Exits Required 
1-500 2 
501-1,000 3 
Greater than 1,000 4 
 
The number of required exits per story of a building is shown in Table 1006.3.1 of the IBC which 
has been reproduced in Table 5 below. It was found that the maximum number of occupants on a floor was 
under 500 people, so the minimum number of required exits is 2. The CIC was found to comply with this 
requirement as it offers 3 stairways total (one more than what is required).  
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Table 5. Number of exits required per story based upon the occupant load of each story 
Occupant Load Per Story 
Minimum Number of Exits or Access 
to Exits from a story required. 
1-500 2 
501-1,000 3 
Greater than 1,000 4 
The arrangement of the exits in a building is governed by Section 1007 of the IBC. For the CIC 
which is sprinklered, the first two exits must be placed 1/3 of the length of the maximum overall diagonal 
dimension of the building or area to be served. For stories and areas requiring 3 or more exits or exit access 
stairways the third exit must be arrange a reasonable distance apart so that if one of the exits becomes 
blocked the other exits will be available to the occupants.  
It was found that the spacing of the exits within rooms are greater than 1/3 of the diagonal distances 
of each space which shows that the exits are within code requirements. The distances between the exit 
stairways are also greater than 1/3 of the diagonal distance of the CIC. Images of these dimensions showing 
compliance taken off the drawings can be seen in Appendix E. 
The exit width requirement for the doors and stairways in all the spaces was found by multiplying 
the number of occupants found in each space by the by the exit capacity factors shown in the Table 6 below. 
Table 6. Tabulated data for the required exit width for level exits and ramps, and stairways. The required width must meet the 
minimum width requirement. If the width of the exit is calculated to be greater than the minimum, then the width of the exit must 
be at minimum the calculated number. 
Exit component Inches per person Minimum Exit width 
Level Exits, Ramps, and 
Corridors 
0.2 (IBC 1005.3.1) 32 inches (IBC 1010.1.1) 
Stairways 0.3 (IBC 1005.3.2) 44 inches (IBC 1011.2) 
The calculated required minimum width of the exits for each room was 32 inches. All the doors for 
each space meet this requirement with the narrowest door is 3 feet (36 inches). The width of the stairs in 
the CIC were found to be approximately 5 feet wide. Using the exit capacity factor for stairs shown in Table 
6 the maximum number of people that each stairway was calculated and reported in Table 7. The stairs 
which are referred to in Table 7 are shown in the building mark-up in Figure 7. 







Figure 7. Figure of the layout of the CIC labeling the exit stairs throughout the building to be referenced later in this Section. 
  






The required width of each stairway was calculated to consider how occupants from building B 
must egress and it was found that the stairway widths were adequate with a small factor of safety. 
Calculations were performed by splitting the occupants from building B evenly between stairway 2 and 3 
(shown in Figure 7) and other stairways were assumed to have the maximum occupant load (all of building 
A or building C) hence the differences in table 7 to table 2. The calculated required stairway widths based 
upon this can be seen in the Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7. Calculated minimum stair width based upon splitting the occupants of building B to the stairway in building C and 











Occupants per IBC 
occupant load 
factors 
Min Stair width 
Required [ft] 
Stair 1 5 
200 2 95 2.375 
200 3 46 1.15 
Stair 2 5 
200 2 160 3.9875 
200 3 112 2.7875 
Stair 3 5.167 
206 2 193 4.7875 
206 3 200 4.9875 
An Analysis was also done looking at the minimum required stair width for the maximum number of 
occupants that could possibly use the stairs (occupants of building B either all to stair 2 or 3). The two 
scenarios are listed out below and the results are shown in Table 8 below. During this scenario the CIC 
would not comply with the prescriptive requirement, however the prescriptive analysis does not take this 
into account when an exit is not available and will be discussed further in the performance-based analysis 
Section of this report. 
1. All the occupants of building B going to  
a. Staircase 3 along with building C occupants 
b. Staircase 2 along with building A occupants 
 
Table 8. Calculated required minimum stairway widths if the occupants of building B are not split between two exits. This is a 












Min Stair Width 
Required [ft] 
Stair 1 5 
200 2 95 5.6 
200 3 46 4.425 
Stair 2 5 
200 2 224 6.4 
200 3 177 6.625 
Stair 3 5.167 
206 2 256 6.4 
206 3 265 6.625 
 






 This analysis was done not considering the available horizontal exit to the CIC. The walkway near 
stairway 1 in Figure 7 connects to the courtyard of another building on the 2nd floor and an exterior walkway 
on the 3rd floor. This was assumed to not be a part of the egress of the CIC as future construction could 
modify and/or limit the availability of this exit.  
 The 2nd floor of the SHB is a mezzanine which is provided with 2 means of egress one of which is 
not connected to the CIC. Further analysis was done as it was found that the occupants of the SHB could 
use the 2nd floor of the CIC for evacuation purposes. The SHB is connected along the corridor of building 
B and C. This connection is shown in Figure 45. The occupants load of the SHB on the 2nd floor is 43 people 
with an occupant loading factor of 50persons/sqft according the SHB drawings obtained. For the CIC to 
still be compliant with the exit/stair widths the occupants of the SHB would either need to  
All use stair 2 as shown in Figure 7 
All of the occupants of building B would need to use stair 2 in Figure 7 and occupants of SHB could use 
Stair 3 in Figure 7. 
All of the SHB occupants would make the primary means of egress the exit not associated with the CIC. 
This is not preferred as most students use the entrance connected with the CIC. 
4.1.3. Exit Fire Resistance Rating 
All the exits are non-rated exterior stairways. The required fire resistance ratings for the corridors 
and the stairways are listed below.  
• No fire protection is required for separation of the interior of the building to the stairs 
because the open corridor in the building connects 2 remote exterior exits.  
• The fire resistance rating for corridors must comply with IBC Table 1020.1. For the class 
B occupancy of this building along with the building being sprinklered corridors are not 
required to be rated. 
o No fire separation is needed from the open-ended corridors of the building as this 
structure falls into exception 3 of Section 1027.6 of the IBC. 
 
4.1.4. Exit Signs 
For the recommended placement of exit signs Section 1013 of the IBC has been summarized below on 
the requirements for exit sign placement.  
• Exits and exit access doors will be marked by approved exit signs readily visible from any direction 
of egress travel. 
• Exit signs are not required in rooms or areas that require only one exit or exit access. 
• Main exterior exit doors or bates that are obviously and clearly identifiable as exits need not have 
exit signs where approved by the building official 
• Where the exit or path of egress travel is not immediately visible to the occupants, the path of egress 
travel to exits and within exits are required to be marked by readily visible exit signs to clearly 
indicate the direction of egress travel. 
• Intervening means of egress doors within exits are required to be marked by exit signs 
• Exit signs are required to be placed such that no point in an exit access corridor or exit passageway 
is more than 100 feet or the listed viewing 






• Provide a minimum of two remote exit signs or directional exit signs, visible from locations in a 
corridor and in spaces with more than 49 occupants 
• Electrically powered, self-luminous and photoluminescent exit signs shall meet IBC Chapter 27. 
 
Suggested placement of exits signs based upon the requirements listed above are shown in the Figure 8 
below. Figure 8 only shows the 2nd floor to be representative of all of the floors. As well, upon review of 
the drawings in the building the placement of exit signs was found to comply with the IBC requirements 
along with matching up with the suggested placement in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Conceptual picture showing the required placement of exit signs throughout the building. The only difference between 
the 2nd and 3rd floor is due to the third-floor building A only being office spaces which allows for the removal of some of the exit 
signs within the classroom shown in this Figure. 
 Exit sign placement placement as shown on the as built drawings was found to comply with the 
requirements of the IBC summarized in this Section. The next code requirement to be discussed will be 
flammability analysis of the interior finishes within the CIC. 
4.2. Flammability Analysis - Interior Finish Requirements 
This Section summarizes the interior finish requirements that are applicable to the CIC. The 
contents of this Section are taken from Chapter 8 of the IBC and other Sections that are referenced. This 
Section does not show if the CIC complies with these requirements as an onsite inspection would be 
required to determine compliance as the interior finish could have changed from the original construction 
of the building. 






4.2.1. Wall and Ceiling Finish 
Wall and ceiling finishes fall under Section 803 of the IBC. The applicable requirements for the 
classification of interior finishes must be tested in accordance with ASTM E84. Classification requirements 
from IBC Table 803.11 are shown in the Table 9 below. 
Table 9. Interior Finish Requirements for different spaces for this building per IBC Table 803.11. Class B = flame spread index 
26-75 and smoke development index 0-450. Class C = flame spread index 76-200 and smoke development index 0-450. 
Element 
Interior wall and ceiling finish 
requirement (Class) 
Interior exit stairways, interior 
exit ramps and exit passageways 
B 
Corridors and enclosures for exit 
access stairways and exit access 
ramps 
C 
Rooms and enclosed spaces C 
4.2.2. Interior Floor Finish 
Interior floor finishes are required to comply with Section 804 of the IBC. In all occupancies 
interior floor covering materials are required to comply with ASTM D2859 (“pill test”). Interior floor finish 
and covering materials in exit enclosures, corridors, and rooms/spaces not separated from corridors by 
partitions are required to withstand a minimum critical heat flux as classified as Class I or II in accordance 
to ASTM E648 or NFPA 253. Class I and II have a minimum critical radiant heat flux corresponding to 
0.45 and 0.22 watts/cm2 respectively. Since the CIC is Group B occupancy interior floor finishes and 
covering must be not less than Class II for exit enclosures for stairways and ramps, exit passageways, 
corridors and rooms or spaces not separated from corridors by partitions. 
4.2.3. Combustible Materials in Type I and Type II construction 
Combustible materials are allowed in Type II construction, but they must comply with Section 805 
of the IBC. This Section discusses subfloor construction, wood finished flooring, and insulating boards in 
the floor. There is no wood finish flooring in the CIC so it will not be discussed further. Subfloor 
construction for floor sleepers, buck and nailing blocks can only be constructed of combustible materials if 
the space between the fire-resistance floor rated assembly and the flooring is either solidly filled with 
noncombustible materials or fire blocked. Insulating boards are limited to be no greater than half an inch 
thick, must be attached directly to noncombustible floor assembly, and must be covered with finish flooring. 
4.2.4. Decorative Materials and Trim 
Section 806 of the IBC covers decorative materials and trims which includes plastics, interior trim, 
interior floor-wall base. The applicable requirements are listed below. 
• Foam plastic trim must comply with Section 2604.2 of the IBC. 
• Interior trim other than foam plastic is required to have a minimum flame spread and smoke 
development index of Class C in accordance with ASTM E84 
• Curtains, draperies and similar combustible decorative materials suspended from walls or ceiling 
are not limited. Where required to have improved fire performance these materials shall be tested 
in accordance to NFPA 701 test 1 or 2 as appropriate or show a maximum heat release rate of 
100kW in accordance to NFPA 289 using the 20kW ignition source. 







Thermal and acoustical insulation shall comply with Section 720 of the IBC. A summary of the probable 
applicable requirements of Section 720 of the IBC is shown below. 
• Concealed insulating materials in accordance with ASTM E-84 
o Flame spread index <= 25 
o Smoke Development index <= 450 
4.2.6. Acoustical Ceiling Systems 
Acoustical Ceilings systems must comply with Section 808 of the IBC. Acoustical materials must 
comply with the interior finish requirements of Section 803 of the IBC which is in accordance to ASTM 
E84 and Table 803.11 of the IBC. 
4.2.7. Flammability Analysis Conclusion 
 The interior finish requirements for walls, ceilings, flooring, decorative materials, trim, and 
insulation have been summarized. No review of the CIC was performed to determine compliance with these 
requirements as not enough information was provided on the as built drawings. 
 
4.3. Fire Alarm 
 This Section of the prescriptive based analysis discusses the fire alarm system including the 
installed devices, spacing requirements, battery calculations, and inspection testing and maintenance 
requirements. Most of the requirements discussed in this Section of the report come from NFPA 72. 
4.3.1. Fire Alarm System Overview 
The fire alarm system installed in the CIC is a Notifier system utilizing Gentex notification devices. 
The Fire alarm control panel (FACP) installed is a Notifier NFS-640 series panel shown in the Figure 9 
below. The data sheet for the FACP can be found in Appendix F. 







Figure 9. Image of the Notifier NFS-640 FACP from the data sheet. 
 
Two Notifier NFS-640 series FACP’s are located within the CIC. One is in building A room A110 
and serves building A only. The other FACP is in building B room B110 and serves both building B and C. 
Something to note is the system for building A does not appear to interact (connect) with the system for 
buildings B and C. The drawings do not indicate if an alarm in building C goes off that occupants in building 
A being served by the other FACP will be notified. This is something that would have to be verified with 
an onsite inspection. 
As well, there are discrepancies between the sequence of operations (SOO) of the fire alarm system 
provided in the drawings when compared to the SOO provided in the specifications for the CIC. The 
discrepancies vary from a difference in terminology used, lack of information from one SOO to the other, 
and contradicting information. No further documentation is currently available on what the exact SOO is 
for the CIC. Both Specifications are provided in Appendix G of this report. 
4.3.2. Detection Devices 
There are three types of fire detection devices installed in the CIC. They include a multi-sensor 
detector with both a thermal sensor and a photoelectric sensor (Figure 11), a manual pull station (Figure 






10), a heat detector (Figure 13), and a fire sprinkler water flow switch (Figure 12). Data sheets for the multi-
sensor detector and manual pull station can be found in Appendix H. 
 
Figure 10. Image of the NBG-12LX notifier addressable manual pull station from the data sheet.  
 
Figure 11. Image of the FAPT-851 Notifier multi-sensor detector from the data sheet. 
 







Figure 12. Image shown is a potter VSR-S water sprinkler flow alarm. The installed sprinkler water flow alarm model and 
manufacturer is not shown in the provided drawings. This picture is for presentation purposes only. 
 
 
Figure 13. Screenshot from technical data sheet of Notifier’s FST-851 thermal heat detector. The technical data sheet for this 
detector can be seen in appendix H. 






For locations of these devices refer to Appendices I and J for the fire alarm drawings and the 
respective mark-ups. A markup showing the location of the fire alarm devices for the 1st floor of building 




Figure 14. Fire alarm drawing mark-up for the first floor of building A. Mark-ups for all floors of the CIC can be seen in 
Appendix I. 






4.3.3. Location And Placement Of Detection Devices 
This Section discusses the code requirements (IBC and NFPA 72 [3]) for fire detection devices in 
the CIC, as well as the compliance of the CIC with these requirements.  
4.3.3.1. IBC Fire Alarm and Detection Requirements. 
The 2015 edition of the IBC requires a manual fire alarm system to be installed in group B 
occupancies where the occupant load is greater than 100 persons above the lowest level of exist discharge 
(IBC §907.2.2).  
The IBC also provides an exception for group B buildings equipped throughout with an 
electronically supervised automatic sprinkler system that will activate the fire alarm system (IBC §907.2.2).  
The CIC is equipped throughout with an automatic sprinkler system that is electronically 
supervised. Therefore, the CIC is not required to provide a manual fire alarm system. The CIC still provides 
manual fire alarm boxes, smoke a smoke detection system, and an occupant notification system. The 
requirements for the detection system will be discussed in the following Sections. 
4.3.3.2. NFPA 72 Detection Requirement 
Since the CIC does not require a fire alarm system the existing fire alarm system will be reviewed 
per requirements of NFPA 72. The requirements for location, spacing, and placement of the detection 
devices will be discussed in this Section.  
Sections 1.2.4 and 17.5.3.3 of NFPA 72 (shown below) shows that a detection system can only be 
required by the applicable building/fire code (the IBC and CFC) and since a detection system is not required 
the spacing requirements of NFPA 72 are not required to be followed. 
1.2.4*  
This Code shall not be interpreted to require a level of protection that is greater than that which 
would otherwise be required by the applicable building or fire code. 
 
17.5.3.3* Nonrequired Coverage. 
 17.5.3.3.1 Detection installed for reasons of achieving specific fire safety objectives, but not 
required by any laws, codes, or standards, shall meet all of the requirements of this Code, with the 
exception of the prescriptive spacing criteria of Chapter 17.  
4.3.3.2.1. Smoke Detection 
The technical data sheets that were found for the smoke detectors installed in the CIC do not list a 
specific spacing. In this instance Section 17.7.3.2.3.1 of NFPA 72 is referred to for a nominal spacing of 
30ft along with two options for spacing requirements. The spacing suggested below are not required, 
however the CIC complies with the below Section of NFPA 72. 
17.7.3.2.3.1*  
In the absence of specific performance-based design criteria, one of the following requirements 
shall apply:  






(1) The distance between smoke detectors shall not exceed a nominal spacing of 30 ft (9.1 m) and 
there shall be detectors within a distance of one-half the nominal spacing, measured at right angles 
from all walls or partitions extending upward to within the top 15 percent of the ceiling height.  
(2) *All points on the ceiling shall have a detector within a distance equal to or less than 0.7 times 
the nominal 30 ft (9.1 m) spacing (0.7S) 
4.3.3.2.2. Heat Detection 
There are only two heat detectors installed in the building and they are installed in the elevator 
machine room and the elevator shaft. The IBC calls for smoke or heat detection in the elevator machine 
room and shaft in order to activate the smoke control system (elevator pressurization) if a smoke control 
system is required (which one is not required nor installed in the CIC). The applicable code Section can be 
seen below. 
3005.3 Pressurization. 
 The elevator machine room, control rooms or control space with openings into a pressurized 
elevator hoistway shall be pressurized upon activation of a heat or smoke detector located in the 
elevator machine room, control room or control space 
4.3.3.2.3. Manual Pull Stations 
 Manual pull stations are located at all the exits within the CIC. This surpasses the requirements of 
the IBC Section 907.2 where only one manual pull station is required to be provided. See Appendix I and 
J for locations of the manual pull stations within the CIC. 
4.3.4. Disposition of alarm, supervisory and trouble signals  
The type of fire alarm system installed in the CIC is a proprietary supervising station alarm system. 
The building is monitored by the Cal Poly Campus police department (which is under the same ownership 
as the building). The following subSections of this report discuss the disposition of alarm, supervisory and 
trouble signal requirements associated with this type of fire alarm system 
4.3.4.1. Disposition Signals 
Summarizing the requirements for dispositions of signals it is required that the fire department be 
notified, a runner/technician sent to the location of alarm within 2 hours, and lastly the system should be 
restored as soon as possible after disposition of cause of the alarm. The code Section of NFPA 72 referring 
to this is reproduced below. 
 
26.4.6.6 Dispositions of Signals.  
26.4.6.6.1 Alarms. Upon receipt of an alarm signal, the proprietary supervising station operator 
shall initiate action to perform the following: 
(1) Notify the fire department, the emergency response team, and such other parties as the authority 
having jurisdiction requires in accordance with 26.2.1  
(2) Dispatch a runner or technician to the alarm location to arrive within 2 hours after receipt of 
a signal 
 (3) Restore the system as soon as possible after disposition of the cause of the alarm signal 







4.3.4.2. Supervisory Signals 
There are two code Sections in NFPA 72, §26.4.6.6.2 and §26.4.6.6.3, which cover the 
requirements for supervisory signals. §26.4.6.6.2 essentially gives the requirements in the instance a guard’s 
supervisory signal is not received. The supervising station is required to contact the premises and then 
dispatch someone within 30 minutes if communications with the guard cannot be established. The code 
Section of NFPA 72 is reproduced below. 
26.4.6.6.2 Guard’s Tour Supervisory Signal. If a guard’s tour supervisory signal is not received 
from a guard within a 15-minute maximum grace period, or if a guard fails to follow a prescribed 
route in transmitting the signals (where a prescribed route has been established), the proprietary 
supervising station operator shall initiate action to perform the following:  
(1) Communicate at once with the protected areas or premises by telephone, radio, calling back 
over the system circuit, or other means accepted by the authority having jurisdiction  
(2) Dispatch a runner to arrive within 30 minutes to investigate the delinquency if communications 
with the guard cannot be promptly established 
§26.4.6.6.3  of NFPA 72 relates to supervisory signals for other items in the fire alarm system such 
as the receipt of a sprinkler system supervisory signal. The requirements of this code Section essentially 
require that someone is sent to investigate in a timely manner and notify the fire department/authority 
having jurisdiction if applicable. The code Section of NFPA 72 summarized is shown below. 
26.4.6.6.3 Supervisory Signals. Upon receipt of sprinkler system and other supervisory signals, 
the proprietary supervising station operator shall initiate action to perform the following, if 
required:  
(1) Communicate immediately with the designated person(s) to ascertain the reason for the signal  
(2) Dispatch personnel to arrive within 2 hours to investigate, unless supervisory conditions are 
promptly restored  
(3) Notify the fire department if required by the authority having jurisidiction  
(4) Notify the authority having jurisdiction when sprinkler systems are wholly or partially out of 
service for 8 hours or more  
(5) Provide written notice to the authority having jurisdiction as to the nature of the signal, time of 
occurrence, and restoration of service when equipment has been out of service for 8 hours or more 
4.3.4.3. Trouble Signals 
Upon receipt of a trouble signal the supervising station, someone is required to immediately 
investigate, dispatch personnel within 4 hours to fix the problem, and notify the fire department and/or the 
authority having jurisdiction. The code Section of NFPA 72 summarized is shown below. 
26.4.6.6.4 Trouble Signals. Upon receipt of trouble signals or other signals pertaining solely to 
matters of equipment maintenance of the alarm system, the proprietary supervising station 
operator shall initiate action to perform the following, if required:  
(1) Communicate immediately with the designated person(s) to ascertain reason for the signal  






(2) Dispatch personnel to arrive within 4 hours to initiate maintenance, if necessary  
(3) Notify the fire department if required by the authority having jurisdiction  
(4) Notify the authority having jurisdiction when interruption of service exists for 4 hours or more 
(5) When equipment has been out of service for 8 hours or more, provide written notice to the 
authority having jurisdiction as to the nature of the signal, time of occurrence, and restoration of 
service 
 
4.3.5. Notification Devices 
The CIC is equipped throughout with horn, strobe, and combination horn strobe notification devices 
for the fire alarm system. The manufacturer of the notification devices is Gentex. Several different part 
numbers for these devices are used and are listed below. A single data sheet (provided in Appendix K) is 
provided for these devices as it contains the data for the GEC/GES/GEH series of devices which these all 
are in. 
• GEH24-R – Horn only 
• GEC3-24WR – Multi-Candela Horn/Strobe 
• GES3-24WR – Multi-Candela Strobe only 
A screenshot was taken from the Gentex technical data sheet of a horn device and a combination horn strobe 
device. This screen shot can be seen in the Figure 15 below.  
 
Figure 15. Screenshot of a Gentex horn and combination horn/strobe device from the technical data sheet which can be found in 
Appendix K. 
The location of the notification devices can be seen briefly in Figure 14 which is a mark-up of all 
of the fire alarm devices within the CIC. For all the mark-ups for the location of notification devices see 
Appendix I. For fire alarm drawings which also show the location of devices see Appendix J. 






4.3.6. Notification appliance location and placement 
This Section of the report discusses the location and spacing requirements of the alarm notification 
devices within the CIC. The IBC Section shown below allows for no notification appliance to be required 
in employee work areas where they have audible coverage. This generally allows for the elimination of 
notification devices in individual offices which is the case for some of the offices in building A of the CIC.  
[F] 907.5.2.3.1 Public use areas and common use areas. Visible alarm notification appliances 
shall be provided in public use areas and common use area 
  
Exception: Where employee work areas have audible alarm coverage, the notification appliance 
circuits serving the employee work areas shall be initially designed with not less than 20- percent 
spare capacity to account for the potential of adding visible notification appliances in the future 
to accommodate hearing-impaired employee(s). 
 
The applicable requirements of notification appliances for NFPA 72 are summarized below. For the full 
relevant code Section and Tables see Appendix L. 
• A sound level of 15dB above the average ambient sound level 
• Wall mounted appliance locations 
o Audible only 
▪ 18.4.8 wall-mounted appliances shall have their tops above the finished floors at 
heights of not less than 90 in. (2.29 m) and below the finished ceilings at distances 
of not less than 6 in. (150 mm). 
o Visual or Visual and Audible appliances (i.e. horn/strobe) 
▪ 18.5.5.1* Wall-mounted appliances shall be mounted such that the entire lens is 
not less than 80 in. (2.03 m) and not greater than 96 in. (2.44 m) above the finished 
floor 
• Spacing requirements in accordance to NFPA 72 Table 18.5.5.4.1 for visual appliances 
 
The spacing and location of the visual notification appliances within the CIC are in compliance with 
the IBC and NFPA 72 requirements. The appropriate candela rating was given for all visual notification 
devices in respect to the spacing requirements from NFPA 72 Table 18.5.5.4.1. 
The spacing and location of the audible devices complies with NFPA 72 and the IBC for buildings B 
and C. The audibility within building A is of question since audible devices where not placed in some 
offices. A calculation was performed in accordance to Chapter 40 of the 5th edition of the SFPE handbook 
to determine the sound pressure level (DBA) within an office [3]. Many of the values in this calculation 
were assumed as full information within the space is not provided. The results of the calculation showed 
that the offices are not in compliance with 15DBA above sound pressure level associated with business 
occupancy (55DBA). The calculation showed that the sound pressure level within an office is 
approximately 50DBA. However, further verification is needed before determining the audibility 
requirements of building A of the CIC have or have not been met. More information would be needed of 
the acoustic properties of the materials and construction of the space to more accurate determine the sound 
pressure level with the calculation method used. More accurate calculations could be performed with 
computer modeling which is outside the scope of this report. For a screenshot of the applicable calculations 
performed and their results see Appendix M. 






4.3.7. Secondary power supply  
The secondary power supply calculations have already been provided in the fire alarm drawings of 
the CIC which can be found in drawings EF6-02 and EF6-03. These drawings also contain the battery 
calculations since batteries were chosen for the secondary power supply. Upon review of the calculations 
in the drawings and performing the calculations as well it was determined that there is sufficient battery 
capacity for the system. The applicable code requirements from NFPA 72 for secondary power supply for 
fire alarm systems is shown below. 
10.6.7.2.1 The secondary power supply shall have sufficient capacity to operate the system under 
quiescent load (system operating in a nonalarm condition) for a minimum of 24 hours and, at the 
end of that period, shall be capable of operating all alarm notification appliances used for 
evacuation or to direct aid to the location of an emergency for 5 minutes, unless otherwise 
permitted or required by the following:  
(1) Battery calculations shall include a 20 percent safety margin to the calculated amp hour rating.  
(2) The secondary power supply for in-building fire emergency voice/alarm communications 
service shall be capable of operating the system under quiescent load for a minimum of 24 hours 
and then shall be capable of operating the system during a fire or other emergency condition for a 
period of 15 minutes at maximum connected load. 
 
Additional calculations where performed based upon the calculations provided in drawings EF6-02 and 
EF6-03 (also seen in Appendix N). The additional calculations performed was to ensure that the voltage 
drop within each circuit did not drop below the minimum voltage requirements for the notification 
devices. The notification devices are run on a 24VDC voltage (taken from drawings). The notification 
appliances when operating at this voltage have a minimum voltage requirement at the terminals of 16 
volts. The minimum voltage found on any of the circuits was determined to be 22.36 volts after 
accounting for voltage drop through the circuit. The summary of this is shown in Table 10 below. 
  






Table 10. Voltage drop calculations based on the drawing’s calculations. This Table shows the calculation results for the terminal 
voltage at the end of the circuit and compares that with the minimum required voltage of the notification appliances. 














S1 A1 22.37 16 6.37  
S2 AB 23.96 16 7.96  
S1 A2 22.36 16 6.36  
S1 A3 23.58 16 7.58  
S1 B1 22.90 16 6.90  
S2 B1 22.96 16 6.96  
S3 C1 23.70 16 7.70  
S1 B2 22.89 16 6.89  
S2 B2 23.02 16 7.02  
S3 C2 23.77 16 7.77  
S1 B3 23.76 16 7.76  
S2 C3 23.71 16 7.71  
  






4.3.8. Inspection Testing and Maintenance  
The requirements for inspection testing and maintenance (ITM) are legally enacted from Section 
907.8 of the International Fire Code (IFC) shown below. The Section calls for the requirements of NFPA 
72 and a few other Sections of the IFC which reference NFPA 72. 
 
907.8 Inspection, testing and maintenance 
The maintenance and testing schedules and procedures for fire alarm and fire detection systems 
shall be in accordance with Sections 907.8.1 through 907.8.5 and NFPA 72. Records of inspection, 
testing and maintenance shall be maintained. 
 
The ITM requirements from NFPA 72 are in Chapter 14 of the code. All equipment of a fire alarm 
system when first installed is required to have an initial acceptance inspection and test. After the initial 
acceptance inspection and testing are required to be performed at a periodic frequency. Each component of 
the fire alarm system has a different interval (time between last inspection and testing). The visual 
inspection frequencies are shown in Table 14.3.1 of NFPA 72. A List of the applicable Sections of the Table 
are shown below.  
 
• Table 14.3.1 visual inspection applicable Sections 
o 1. All equipment 
o 2. Control Equipment 
o 5. In-Building Fire Emergency voice/alarm communications equipment 
o 9. Batteries 
o 17. Initiating devices 
o 22. Notification appliances 
o 23. Exit marking audible notification appliances 
o 27. Supervising station alarm systems - receivers 
The testing interval of requirements in NFPA 72 can be found in Table 14.4.3.2. The applicable Sections 
of the Table for the CIC system are listed below. 
• Table 14.4.3.2 Testing 
o 1. All equipment 
o 2. Control equipment and transponder 
o 3. Fire alarm control unit trouble signals 
o 4. Supervising station alarm systems – transmission equipment 
o 7. Secondary (standby) power supply 
o 9. Battery tests 
o 15. Conductors – metallic 
o 16. Conductors - nonmetallic 
o 17. Initiating devices 
o 22. Alarm notification appliances 






The frequencies of these testing and inspection requirements vary greatly and can become detail 
specific on the system installed. An example is the battery used as secondary power for the FACP. The 
testing and inspection requirements vary greatly for the type of battery installed. 
The testing requirements of smoke detectors are required to be in accordance to Sections 14.4.4.3.1 
through 14.4.4.3.7 of NFPA 72. Some of the requirements that stand out are that the smoke detectors within 
the CIC are required to be tested within 5 years (NFPA 72 14.4.4.5.4) where at least two or more detectors 
are required to be tested on each initiating circuit annually (NFPA 72 14.4.4.5.1). The testing is to ensure 
that the detectors are calibrated properly and have the correct sensitivity.  
The maintenance of the fire alarm system falls under the requirements of NFPA 72 Section 14.5. 
This Section requires that the system be maintained in accordance to the manufacture’s published 
instructions (Section 14.5.2) and that the frequency of maintenance is dependent on local ambient 
conditions (Section 14.5.3) 
Records of ITM are required to be kept in accordance to NFPA 14.6.2. Records are required to be 
kept until the next test and a year thereafter. The records are required to be on a medium that will survive 
the retention period (paper or electronic is permitted). Finally, a record of all inspection, testing, and 
maintenance is required to be provided in accordance to 7.8.2 which provides documentation/forms that 
can be filled out. 
4.3.9. Fire Alarm Conclusion 
 The code requirements of NFPA 72 for fire alarm detection and notification systems have been 
summarized in this section of this report. As well, voltage drop and battery calculations were verified. Upon 
review of the CIC drawings it was found that the majority of the systems comply with NFPA 72 with an 
exception to audibility requirements in the first floor of building A. The audibility requirements can be 
quickly verified with testing and if need be an additional horn notification device can be added to resolve 
this non-compliance. 
4.4. Water Based Fire Suppression 
 This Section of the prescriptive analysis will be discussing the water-based fire suppression 
(sprinkler system) and its requirements within the CIC. 
4.4.1. Automatic Sprinkler System Overview  
The CIC is required to have an automatic sprinkler system per IBC due to the area of the building 
and the building construction type (Type IIB) [1]. The gross area of the CIC is 48,882 square feet which 
exceeds the maximum allowable area of a non-sprinklered building for Group B occupancies of this 
construction type (Table 506.2 IBC) [1]. 
The CIC is equipped throughout with a wet pipe automatic sprinkler system utilizing Viking 
Microfast quick response sprinklers designed in accordance with the 1999 version of NFPA 13 for light 
and ordinary hazard occupancy. For the purpose of this report the automatic sprinkler system will be 
checked using the 2016 version of NFPA 13 [4].  
4.4.2. Automatic Sprinkler System Water Supply 
The water supply for the CIC automatic sprinkler system comes from the public water main in San 
Luis Obispo California. Figure 16 shows the characteristics of the water supply system test. The water flow 
test was conducted on September 3rd, 2002 and it determined that the static pressure was 90psi, the residual 
pressure was 82psi, and the flow was 1136gpm. For designing a new or modified sprinkler system a new 






water flow test would be required to obtain more current values for the static pressure, residual pressure, 
and flow rate from the public water main. 
 
Figure 16. Table from the automatic sprinkler shop drawings for the CIC showing the water flow test and other design data. 
 The location at which the water flow test was taken is shown in Figure 17 in a red outlined box. 
The blue line in the Figure below shows the water supply adjacent to the CIC. The location of the water 
flow test was at an adjacent hydrant, but not the closest hydrant to building A or C.  
 
Figure 17. Mark-up area view from google earth showing the location at which the water flow test was taken from. 
 
  






4.4.3. Automatic Sprinkler System Occupancy Classification and 
Requirements 
The hazard group classification based upon space usage in accordance with NFPA 13 2016 ed. 
was found to consist of light hazard and ordinary hazard 1 for the CIC [4]. A list of the space usages that 
are within the hazard classification of NFPA 13 are shown in the list below. 
Occupancy Classification: 
• Ordinary Hazard Group 1 
o Mechanical and Service Rooms 
o Storage rooms 
o Laboratory areas 
▪ Classrooms in building A and B 
• Light Hazard 
o Office and general building area 
▪ Offices throughout CIC and classrooms in building C 
Using the density area method in NFPA 13 the design criteria for the occupancy classification can be seen 
in the list below [4]. 
Design Criteria for Occupancy Classification: 
• Ordinary Hazard Group 1 
o 0.15gpm/sqft 
o 250gpm hose allowance 
• Light Hazard  
o 0.1gpm/sqft 
o 100gpm hose allowance 
4.4.4.  System Hardware 
The existing pipping in the sprinkler system is schedule 40 black steel. The pipping nominal sizes 
for the risers, cross-mains, and branch lines can be seen in Table 11 below. Appendix O shows the 
automatic sprinkler shop drawings from the contractor that installed the system. Appendix O traces the 
sprinkler pipping in red to make the pipping layout easier to read along with easier identification of where 
the riser’s are located. 
Table 11. Nominal Size of the automatic sprinkler system risers, cross-mains, and branch lines. 
Component Size [nominal] 
System Risers 3” 
Cross-Mains 3” 
Branch Lines 1.5”, 1.25”, 1” 
 
 The first page of the sprinkler shop drawings as seen in Appendix C gives the type of sprinklers 
used throughout the CIC. The technical data sheets for the sprinklers can be seen in Appendix P. Table 12 
below summarizes the technical information on the sprinklers installed in the building (k-factor and 
temperature rating). 
 







Table 12. Summarized general information on the sprinkler’s used in the CIC. See Appendix P for the technical data sheets for 
the sprinklers. 
Sprinkler Name K-factor Temp Rating [F] 
Viking Microfast Model “M” 
Quick Response Standard 
Sprinklers 
5.6 155 
Viking Microfast (VK305) 
Quick Response Horizontal 
Sidewall Sprinklers 
5.6 155 
Viking Quick Response Model 







Figure 18. Image showing on the 3rd floor of the CIC the locations of the most remote areas selected for the system demand 
calculations. The areas selected are in red boxes and the location of the risers are shown with purple boxes in the left hand portion 
of this Figure. 
4.4.5. Hydraulic Calculation 
Hydraulic calculations were performed for the CIC in buildings B and A in the hydraulically most 
demanding area. Two different calculations were performed to account for there being two different risers 






feeding 2 different sprinkler systems. For the calculations it was assumed that the fire flow test information 
as shown in Figure 16 would apply for both sprinkler systems. Appendix Q shows the areas in which the 
hydraulic calculations were performed as well as a screenshot of excel calculations performed to produce 
the system demand curve as shown in Figure 19 below. The most hydraulically challenging area used was 
on the third floor and the furthest distance from the riser in both buildings. The hydraulic graph in the Figure 
19 shows the sprinkler demand curves for both buildings A and B (including the hose stream allowance), 
and the city water supply curve from the water flow test. For calculation purposes building A was assumed 
to have only light hazard as the primary occupancy for the building was office space and building B was 
ordinary hazard.  The water demand at the base of the riser for building A was found to be 264gpm at 
39.8psi, and the water demand at the base of the riser for building B was found to be 588gpm at 73.6psi. 
 
 
Figure 19. Hydraulic graph showing the city water supply curve from the water flow test and the sprinkler demand curves from 
building A and building B of the CIC. 
 The result of the calculations based on the flow testing provided shows that the water supply is sufficient to meet the 
demands of the automatic-sprinkler system within the CIC.  There is enough sufficient water supply based on these calculations 
were a fire pump and on site water storage will mostly likely not be required. There may be a chance that a more current flow test 
indicates otherwise (that a fire pump or on site water storage may be required). 






4.4.6. Inspection, Testing and Maintenance 
This Section summarizes the inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) requirements for the CIC 
which are found in NFPA 25 (referred to in §27 of NFPA 13) [4].  
 
4.4.6.1. NFPA 13 ITM Summary 
§27 of NFPA 13 calls for the sprinkler heads, hose valves, hoses, alarm devices, control valve 
operating mechanisms to be removed for an inactive or abandoned sprinkler system to prevent the 
assumption that the building is sprinklered.  
 
4.4.6.2. NFPA 25 ITM Summary: 
NFPA 25 requires that the property owner or a designated representative is responsible for properly 
maintaining the water-based fire protection systems within the building [5]. NFPA 25 also requires that no 
changes in occupancy, use or process or materials used or stored in building without evaluation of the fire 
protection systems capabilities [5]. Changing the occupancy or the hazard associated with the space could 
affect the protection requirements needed to protect the space. The worst-case scenario is the hazard is 
increased and the water-based fire protection system will become inadequate to protect the space with the 
increased hazard. 
The minimum required frequencies for ITM can be found in NFPA 25 Table 5.1.1.2 (Appendix R) 
for sprinkler systems and in Table 13.1.12 (Appendix R) for common components and valves [5]. Some 
general requirements for ITM of sprinkler systems are discussed below. For all the possible applicable 
requirements refer to NFPA 25. 
Where sprinklers are required to be inspected from the floor level annually any of the following 
requires that the sprinkler be replaced [5]. 
1. Leakage 
2. Corrosion detrimental to sprinkler performance 
3. Physical damage 
4. Loss of fluid in the glass bulb heat-responsive element 
5. Loading detrimental to sprinkler performance 
6. Paint other than that applied by the sprinkler manufacturer. 
If sprinklers are found to be in the incorrect orientation, they are required to be corrected by 
repositioning the branch line or replacing the drop or sprig [5]. Sprinklers installed in concealed spaces 
such as above suspended ceilings do not require inspection [5].   
 Once sprinklers have been in service for 50 years the sprinklers will be required to be replaced or 
submitted to a recognized testing laboratory accepTable to authority having jurisdiction for testing[5]. If 
the sprinklers are continued to be used the testing procedure is required to be repeated at 10-year intervals 
and once they have been in service for 75 years, the testing interval is required to be every 5 years [5]. 
 Sprinklers that have been removed from the system for any reason will not be reinstalled [5]. For 
further information on the replacement of existing sprinklers see §5.4 of NFPA 25 for more requirements. 
The building owner or designated represenative is required to designate an impairment coordinator 
to comply with the requirements of §15 of NFPA 25. This Section also requires that the impairment 






coordinator implements a plan for emergency impairments (§15.6) as well as preplanned impairments 
(§15.5). Once the system has been repaired the impariment coordinator is required to follow the procedures 
outlined in §15.7. Whenever a component in a sprinkler system is adjusted, repaired, reconditioned, or 
replaced, the actions required in NFPA 25 Table 5.5.1 and 13.11.1 are required where applicable. These 
actions do not require a design review outside of the scope of NFPA 25.  
During inspection where pipe blockage is suspected in the fire protection system see §14 of NFPA 
25 for the minimum requirements for conduction investigations for possible sources of materials that could 
cause the pipe blockage. 
4.4.7. Water Based Fire Suppression Conclusion 
 The Water Based Fire Suppression Section of this report summarized the applicable code 
requirements from the IBC, NFPA 13, and ITM requirements of NFPA 25 as well as discussing the 
attributes of the installed automatic sprinkler system. The installed automatic sprinkler system’s hardware 
was discussed along with the water demand from two hydraulically calculated remote areas. It was 
determined that the water supply was sufficient based on the flow test data on the as built drawings.  
 
4.5. Structural 
 This Section of the prescriptive based analysis will be review the structural fire requirements in 
accordance with the IBC, the building materials used, and an overview of the fire safety strategy. 
4.5.1. Code Requirements 
 The type of construction as indicated by the title page of the CIC drawings is Type II B construction. 
Using the 2015 version of the International Building Code the building is required to be a minimum of Type 
VB construction. If only considering Buildings A, B, and C of the CIC and not the Simpson High Bay the 
area, height, and number of stories is: 
1. 48,882sqft in area 
2. 46ft in height 
3. 3 stories in height 
The limiting factor in Chapter 5 of the IBC is the area. Type VB construction only allows for an area of 
27,000sqft (IBC Table 506.2). The allowable area can be increased using IBC equation 5.2 in Section 
506.2.3 shown in figure 19 below 
 







Figure 20. Screenshot of IBC Section 506.2.3 for allowable area increase for single occupancy multistory buildings 
Using the equation from figure 20 assuming not frontage area increases the allowable area is permitted to 
be 81,000sqft as At = 27,000sqft and Sa = 3. 
 The maximum number of stories for Type VB construction is 3 stories (IBC Table 504.4) for class 
B occupancies and the maximum height is 60ft (IBC Table 504.3) for class B occupancies. The actual 
height and number of stories either matches or falls within these requirements thus, the CIC could 
technically have been built as Type VB construction if it was built under the 2015 edition of the IBC. 
However, since the building was built using Type IIB construction the requirements for Type IIB 
construction will be discussed while the requirements of Type VB will not be discussed.  
 Type IIB construction does not require fire resistive building elements for the following items 
according to Table 601 in the 2015 IBC and the building being fully sprinklered [1].  
1. Primary Structural frame 
2. Bearing Walls  
a. Interior 
b. Exterior 
3. Nonbearing walls and partitions exterior 
4. Floor construction and associated secondary members 
5. Roof construction and associated secondary members 
 The only thing not mentioned above was the fire resistance rating required for exterior walls. 
Exterior walls do not require fire resistance ratings for two reasons. The first being buildings A,B, C, and 
the SHB are considered one building on the same lot per IBC Section 503.1.2 and the second is because the 
exterior walls are greater than  10 feet from another building. This 10ft of separation allows the exterior 
walls to be non-rated per Table 602 of the 2015 IBC which is summarized in table 13 below.  Mark-ups of 
the drawings highlighting the elements which have fire resistance ratings can be found in Appendix S. 
Table 13. Summarized Table 602 from the IBC  
Fire Separation Distance Less than 5ft 5ft to less than 10ft 10ft and greater 
Fire Resistance Rating Required 
(Hr) 
1 1 0 
 







 The external wall openings are required to comply with IBC Section 705. The CIC is approximately 
20ft away from the closest building on the west side of the CIC. Table 14 below summarizes the applicable 
maximum area of exterior wall openings based on separation distance and opening protection. 
Table 14. IBC Table 705.8 for wall opening percent area based on separation distance and degree of opening protection 
Fire Separation Distance (ft) Degree of Opening Protection Allowable Area 
15ft to less than 20ft 
Unprotected 75% 
Protected 75% 
20ft and greater Unprotected and Protected No Limit 
  
One of the only elements in this structure that has fire resistive elements are the vertical shaft enclosures 
(which also include the elevator). All these enclosures comply with Section 713.4 of the IBC.  
 The only 2 hour rated wall throughout this structure is the wall separating building B from building 
C. This wall is part of a separation of buildings per the original 2001 California Building code as the 
allowable area for Type IIB construction was much smaller than what the 2015 IBC allows. The 2 hour 
wall separating building B and C is not required under the 2015 IBC as the allowable area exceeds the 
actual building area allowing all the structures to be considered one building (IBC §503.1.2). A brief 
historical code summary can be found in Section 3.2 of this report. 
 
  






4.5.2. Building Materials Used 
 For a list of the building materials used for the different structural elements see the Table 15 below. 
Table 15. This Table summarizes the materials used for each of the structural elements included.  
 
4.5.3. Fire Safety Strategy  
The structural fire safety strategy will be discussed in this Section and will not provide a complete 
overview of the other fire safety strategies needed to fully protect the occupants and the property of a 
structure in accordance with the building code. 
 Building elements within Type IIB construction do not require a fire resistance rating (IBC Table 
601). The main fire resistance elements throughout this structure are the 1 hour rated resistive walls 
surrounding the vertical shaft enclosures. This hourly rating is applied in these locations as to protect the 
occupants that are not intimate with the fire. By having rated walls around vertical enclosures, it allows the 
fire to be compartmentalized by not allow the spread of fire and smoke to adjacent spaces and floors.  
 Fire stopping is used in this building in wall penetrations to prevent the passage of smoke to another 
space along with preventing the easy spread of fire through an opening. Once again this is to protect people 
that are in adjacent spaces from the hazards of smoke by compartmentalization.  
 The existing separation of building B and C even though not required by the code can be used to 
help support the intent to protect occupants not intimate with the fire. The use of 90 min rated doors can be 
seen in a walkway connecting building C and B. This rated door can be closed once occupants have exited 
building B to provide protection of occupants from an exposure fire from the SHB. 
4.5.4. Structural Conclusion 
 The CIC was determined to require a minimum construction Type of VB under the 2015 IBC 
however, the CIC was built using Type IIB construction due to the building code the CIC was design under. 
It was found that the CIC complies with all of the requirements for structural fire resistance ratings for Type 
IIB construction under the 2015 IBC. Upon a review of the drawings it appears that the materials selected 




Concrete Slab with Steel I beam also fire 
proofing to separate curtain wall 
Roof Assemblies Concrete and steel, I beam 
Exterior Walls 
Insulated spandrel glass, concrete, metal panel 
cladding 
Interior Walls Rated Type X Gypsum Wall board 
Door Openings 
Door: Wood, Aluminum, H.M. (Hollow Metal 
Door 
Frame: Aluminum, H.M 
Joints 
See A8.03 concrete structural slab over metal 
decking, expansion joint concrete, silicone, butyl 
adhesive strip 
Penetrations 
 ¾” Fireproof sealant on both sides of penetration 
using FireStop 2000 or approved equal 
Partitions Gypsum wallboard 






will comply with the IBC for fire resistance requirements for things such as penetrations. How these 
materials are installed was not verified if they match the as built drawings. This section wraps up the 
prescriptive based, code based, design analysis and the next section of this report will discuss the 
performance based analysis.  
5. PERFORMANCE BASED DESIGN 
 
 The goals of the performance-based analysis were taken from NFPA 101. The goals that will be 
discussed in this Section of the report will be to protect the occupants do not intimate with the fire (NFPA 
101 §4.1) via preventing occupants from being exposed to hazardous/untenable conditions associated with 
a fire and looking at fire effects on structural integrity of some building elements (NFPA 101 §4.2). This 
will be accomplished by providing realistic challenging fire scenarios in accordance with NFPA 101 design 
fire scenarios (NFPA 101 §5.5.2). The design fire scenarios analyzed from NFPA 101 include design fire 
scenario’s 1, 2, 7, and 8 (NFPA 101 §5.5.2). 
 The performance-based design portion of this report reviews several different design fires with 
hand calculations to determine the combined heat release rate curve considering ignition of multiple items 
along with a detailed analysis of a design fire in the Simpson High Bay. The design fire in the SHB is 
compared to egress modeling with both hand calculations and computer modeling to compare ASET and 
RSET times.  
5.1. Design Fire Analysis 
 The making of the design fires used in the performance-based analysis is described in this Section 
from the fuel analysis to the calculation method used to determine when and if a second item ignites.  
5.1.1. Fuel Analysis 
 There are many different materials throughout this building that are flammable/fuels to potential 
fires. This Section discusses some of the more notable fuels throughout the CIC but does not include all 
fuels needed for a complete hazard analysis.  It must also be noted that many of the fuels present in this 
building are from furniture. Furniture can be moved into different orientations or replaced with furniture 
that is not in accordance with the original design. Figure 20 below shows some of the various furniture 
present in the CIC that could be the source of a design fire. Many of the rooms have similar layouts and 
similar furniture currently within in them so a few photos can give the reader a very good idea of what 
furniture fuel hazards reside within the building. For example, building C is mostly lecture rooms while 
building B is mostly labs, and building A is labs, offices, and conference rooms. 
  







A) Typical classroom furniture seen in building C 
 
  
B) Typical furniture seen in interior corridors in 
building A 
C) Lab in building A which is similar to Labs in building B 
 
Figure 21. This Figure is various photos taken throughout the CIC to show the typical furniture seen in the labs, 
classrooms, and a corridor of the CIC. 
 
 The orientation of the desks in Figure 21A) are of interest to see if one desk has a large enough heat 
release rate to ignite the next desk on fire along with if there will be a large enough heat release rate to have 
the lecture room reach flash over conditions. Figure 21B) presents a sofa in an exit corridor in building A 
and is of interest as the sofa could not be TB-133 compliant which would greatly affect the performance of 
this space. Further analysis through the development of design fires for Figures 21A) and 21B) will be 
discussed later.  
 The next fuel load hazard that is notable on the exterior of the building is the trees planted around 
the building. The trees on the exterior of the building are planted very close to the building and in some 
cases are touching the exterior of the building. Figure 22 below shows the proximity of some of the trees 
to the building. Building C is the building that currently has trees closest to the exterior of the building and 
some of which are in contact with the exterior of the structure. These trees could be problematic in the event 
of a fire catching a tree on fire which can then spread to another floor. 







Figure 22. This Figure shows the exterior of building C from the south east side of the CIC. The trees on the left side 
of the photo (east side of the building) are in contact with the structure and are still small trees. These trees in the 
future will continue to grow and could provide a larger fuel source for a fire to break out. The tree on the south side 
of the structure is not in contact with the building but could be in contact in the future. 
 
 Upon walking through building C the corridor between the restrooms and the lecture rooms have 
trash and recycle cans in the exit corridors. These trash cans along with student backpacks (professors could 
require students to leave there backpacks outside of the room during a test) could be enough fuel to create 
a fire which could hinder egress through the corridor between building B and C as shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Trash cans in building C corridor on the 2nd floor. 
 






5.1.2. Design Fire Calculation Method 
 This Section discusses the methodology used for creating the design fires in this report. The 
correlations and equations used to develop the final heat release rate (HRR) curves which account for 
flashover, sprinkler activation, and smoke detection are also included in this Section.  
 There are several different variations in the process for creating a design fire, but only one process 
will be discussed. The method for finding design fires that was used and is discussed uses more conservative 
assumptions than most other methods hence the lack of detail on other methods. Microsoft Excel in 
conjunction with MATLAB was used to perform the calculations described below but is not the only 
program that can be used. Python is one of many other programs/coding languages that can be used to 
perform these calculations. The nomenclature for the equations in this Chapter can be seen in Table 16 
below. 
Table 16. Nomenclature for equations mention in this Chapter of this report. 
Nomenclature  Subscripts 
     
𝐴 Area  𝑜 Openings 
𝐻 Height of compartment  𝐹𝑂 Flashover 
?̇? Heat Release Rate [HRR]  𝑇 Total 
𝑅 Distance from fire to a fuel package   ex External 
𝑟 Horizontal distance from fire to sprinklers   R Radiation  
𝑇 Temperature   jet Jet 
𝑢 Velocity  C Numerical Area 
𝑅𝑇𝐼 Sprinkler response time index  d Detector (sprinkler bulb) 
𝑡 time  b burnout 
?̇?" Heat flux  ∞ Ambient 
∆𝐻𝑐 Heat of combustion  s Soot 
?̇? Rate of mass production    
 
 The purpose of design fires is to develop HRR curves to model potential fires that can be used in 
later analysis. Design fires do not question the probability of combustion happening in a space. Design fires 
assume the probability of combustion is 100% and hence the analysis of design fires starting after ignition.  
 The first calculation performed in the process of design fires is to determine the HRR at which the 
compartment of interest reaches flashover conditions. This is accomplished by using Babruaskas’s and 
Thomas’s correlation seen in Equations 5.1 and 5.2. 
 
Babrauskas Correlation: 






 ?̇?𝐹𝑂 = 7.8𝐴𝑇 + 378𝐴𝑜√𝐻 (5.2) 
 






 Several ventilation factors were considered including an open door only along with both an open 
door and open window. Due to the small differences between the flashover heat release rates found, an 
averaged HRR value was used which is presented later in this report. Once the flashover HRR for a 
compartment is determined HRR burn test data is needed for items in the compartment. The source of 
combustion from one of the fuel packages must be selected from the HRR data found.  
 The next step of creating a design fire is determining when the next item will ignite. This is 
accomplished by calculating the incident heat flux (radiation) on other fuel packages in the compartment 
and comparing it to the critical heat flux at which these items will ignite. This is done by using equation 
5.3. This equation assumes the source is a single point and accounts for the radiation configuration factor 
from the point to another object. The value for the HRR at a given time is the input ?̇?𝑟 to equation 5.3. ?̇?𝑟 
is assumed to be 30% of the HRR value at any time since it has been found experimentally that a maximum 











 Data for the ignition heat flux can be found for different materials in the SFPE Handbook among 
other sources. For items that are composed of several different materials the lowest critical heat flux value 
is suggested to be used for conservative calculations. The critical heat flux for ignition of wood was used 
in my design fires as wood had a lower possible critical heat flux for ignition than the other materials, 
furniture, and other objects. 
 Once the critical heat flux of a fuel package has been reached, the HRR curve for that item is added 
to the initial HRR curve (HRR curve of the item that was the source of the fire) at the time which the critical 
heat flux was reached. This process continues until the HRR includes all fuel packages that have ignited at 
their respective times. This HRR curve will need to be modified to account for flashover conditions and 
sprinkler activation. 
 Sprinkler activation is determined using Alpert’s ceiling jet correlation along with Equation 5.7. 
Alpert’s ceiling jet correlation seen in Equations 5.4 and 5.5 is used to determine the temperature and 
velocity of the gases along the ceiling at a given horizontal distance away from the fire. The inputs to the 
sprinkler model that was used can be seen in Table 17 below. A sprinkler spacing of 4.6 meters was used 
as NFPA 13 calls for a maximum sprinkler spacing of 4.6 meters. Using this maximum allowable sprinkler 
spacing allows for a greater safety factor for sprinkler activation. 
 




Sprinkler Spacing [m] 4.6 
Sprinkler activation Temp. [C] 74 
 






 Once the gas velocity and temperature have been found they can then be used in the discretized version of 
Equation 5.6 (Equation 5.7) to find the temperature of the sprinkler bulb at the next time step. 
 
Alpert Ceiling Jet correlation: 
  











>  .18 
(5.4) 
   














>  .18  (5.5) 
 










   
 
𝑇𝑑
𝑖+1 =  
√𝑢𝑗𝑒𝑡
𝑅𝑇𝐼
(𝑇𝑗𝑒𝑡 −  𝑇𝑑
𝑖 ) + 𝑇𝑑
𝑖  (5.7) 
 
When either sprinkler activation has occurred, or the compartment has reached flashover the HRR 
curve must be modified to account for the new burn out time and maximum HRR. It is assumed in both 
instances that the HRR will be limited to either the flashover HRR or the HRR at the time of sprinkler 
activation. It is also assumed that no more fuel will be ignited once these conditions are met. These two 
assumptions can be used together to calculate the new time to burn out for the compartment. This is 
accomplished by numerically integrating the area under the unmodified HRR curve without flashover or 
sprinkler activation accounted for and setting the area equal to the modified HRR curve with a limit set on 
the maximum HRR value.  
 Numerical integration was performed using Equation 5.8 to calculate the area under the unmodified 
HRR curves for all the ignited fuels. Then using Equation 5.9 to find the new time to burn out by dividing 
the area of the original HRR curve (calculated in 5.8) by the maximum HRR. The numerical integration 
used to calculate the area under the HRR curve used was left endpoint Reisman’s sum.  Reisman’s sum 
calculates the area under the curve by finding the summation of many rectangles which are found by 
multiplying an x distance (time step in this case) by the Y value at that point (in this case HRR value).  
Reisman’s sum: 
 
















 The final equation that is not used in the process of making a design fire but should be discussed is 
the soot yield Equation 5.9 below. The equation below calculates the mass of soot produced in a fire and 
the soot yield concentration factor along with the heat of combustion of different materials are an input to 
computational programs such as FDS. 
Soot Yield Equation: 
 




   
5.1.2.1. Fire Detection Activation 
 The activation of smoke detectors uses much of the same method as used for sprinkler activation 
as discussed in Section 5.1.2 of this report. The resulting design fire HRR is needed which is used in Alpert’s 
Ceiling Jet correlation to determine the temperature rise next to a detector. Since little is known about 
smoke production characteristics of different fires activation criteria for smoke detectors is based upon the 
temperature rise from the ceiling jet along with the fuels involved in the fire. The table referenced for these 
temperature rises comes from NFPA 72 Table B4.7.5.3 as shown below in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Table from NFPA 72 showing the temperature rise associated with the different smoke detector activations. 
 
 The smoke detectors present within the CIC are all photoelectric detectors also known as light 
scattering detectors. It was assumed for the design fires discussed later in this report that the activation 
criteria was an average between wood and polyurethane. This assumption was made since not all the 
material characteristics of the items in the design fire are known and this leads to a more conservative 
activation temperature rise of 24.45 degrees Celsius.  
 
5.2. Design Fire Selection 
 The follow subsections detail each one of 4 design fires throughout the CIC which were selected 
in accordance with NFPA 101 design fire scenarios. throughout the CIC and their results. Each design fire 
scenario has heat release rate curves supported by burn test data which is then used for either structural or 






tenability analysis. The design fire which is discussed in detail with computer modeling is the SHB as it 
presents the most hazardous scenario to occupants in the CIC.  
 Design fires which have a structural analysis component (lecture room, conference room in 
building B, and the SHB) the following applies. In ihe lecture room and conference room design fires, both 
the Alpert ceiling jet correlation and a 2-zone model coupled with the Thomas plot were considered when 
determining which temperature to use for the input to the finite difference method model. It was found in 
both cases that the 2-zone model provided a higher temperature. Due to a higher temperature being found 
with the 2-zone model, this model was used to keep this analysis conservative as Alpert’s ceiling jet 
correlation is only good for determining temperature values during the initial phase of the fire in which a 
ceiling jet is present. Once the smoke layer begins to descend the 2-zone model more accurately models the 
temperature of the smoke layer. 
 
5.2.1. Design Fire 1 - Lecture Room 
 This design fire scenario was based upon NFPA 101 design fire scenario 1. This scenario accounts 
for an occupant specific fire scenario with a variety of ventilation factors. The location of this design fire is 
in a lecture room on the second floor of building C shown in Figure 25. This classroom closely resembles 
Figure 25B) as it has the same furniture and layout for the room. This classroom is adjacent to a set of stairs 
in which part of the 3rd floor of the building would use as a primary means of egress. This fire could 
potentially block the stairs or make the means of egress by that set of stairs not possible. Another reason 
this classroom is being selected is due to the flash over conditions that can occur along with looking at how 
sprinkler activation affects the design fire. This fire could potentially affect the hourly rated wall which is 
protecting a vertical shaft that goes through all 3 floors. The hourly rated wall is discussed further under 
the structural Section for this design fire. 
 
 
Figure 25. Image of the CIC on the second floor. The location of this design fire is outline with the red box. 
 The only HRR curve used for this design fire was one for the desks in the classroom. The HRR 
curve found from burn test data can be seen in Figure 26. HRR curve from a wood reinforced urethane 
foam chair was selected as it resembles the material composition of the desks in the lecture room. 








A) HRR curve for a similar chair comprised of similar materials of 
the chairs found in a lecture room. The chair in this test is comprised 
of one-piece wood reinforced urethane foam [6]. 




 Figure 26. A) HRR curve used for student chairs seen in B) 
 
The layout of the chairs in the lecture room that are being used for this design fire along with the 
order in which a chair or a group of chairs will be ignited can be seen in Figure 27 and Table 18 below.  
 
Figure 27. This Figure is a representation of the typical layout in these lecture rooms of the student chairs as seen in Figure 26 )B. 
Each number represents a chair along with the time each chair will ignite. The exact number of chairs ignited in each sequence 
can be seen in the Table 18 below. 
The order the chairs were determined to ignite was based upon the view factor of each chair. Since 
the view factor for each chair was assumed to be the same the order of ignition was only dependent upon 






the distance away from the source of the fire. The average spacing between chairs can be seen in Figure 27 
above. If the chairs had a similar distance away from the source of the fire (#1 in Figure 27 above) then the 
chairs were grouped together to ignite at the same time. The order of ignition, the number of chairs in each 
ignition along with the time to ignition can be seen in Table 18 below. 
Table 18. This Table goes with Figure 27. The column on the left represents the numbers corresponding to the numbered chairs 
in Figure 27 above.  







1 1 0 Source of Design Fire 
2 2 242   
3 2 252   
4 4 300   
5 2 346   
6 8 380   
7 10 382   
8 12 416   
9 8 452 All Chairs Assumed to Ignite at same time  
 
After going through the design fire process three HRR curves where produced that can be seen in 
Figure 28. Figure 28 A) is the final unmodified heat release rate curve not accounting for flashover or 
sprinkler activation while B) accounts for sprinkler activation and C) accounts for flashover.  
  







A) Unmodified HRR curve not 
accounting for sprinkler 
activation or flashover 
conditions 
 
B) The HRR curve accounting for 
sprinkler activation 
 
C) The modified HRR curve for 
flash over 
Figure 28. HRR curves produced for the design fire in the lecture room on the 2nd floor of building C. The HRR curves produced 
for this design fire used a critical heat flux of 10 [kW/m2] for wood which is lower than polyurethane and assumed a sprinkler 
distance of 5 meters away from the starting point of this fire. 
 
  






Table 19. Notable data from the HRR curves in Figure 28. 
HRR Curve Maximum HRR [kw] Time of Occurrence [s] Burn out time [s] 
Unmodified HRR Curve 25725 N/A 1872 
Sprinkler Activation 983.3 424 17716 
Flashover 2929 541 6284 
 
 It can be seen from the HRR curves in Figure 28 and the data in Table 19 how much fire sprinklers 
will reduce the HRR which can prevent the room from reaching flash over conditions when the only fuel 
that is burned is from the desks in the room. This design fire does not account for other fuels that could be 
brought into the room by occupants such as backpacks and their contents. The extra fuel load brought in 
from occupants could increase the severity of this design fire by allowing the lecture room to reach flash 
over conditions in less time and could have a flame spread which could possibly not be contained by the 
activation of sprinklers. 
 The materials assumed to be present in this design fire are shown Table 20. If further analysis was 
performed in computer modeling such as Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) then these values would be used 
as inputs. 
Table 20. List of materials burned in the design fire in the lecture room of building C and the soot yield concentration factors 
from the different fuel packages. From Table A.39 of SFPE handbook [3]. 
Fuel Soot Yield [g/g] CO Yield [g/g] ∆𝑯𝒄 [KJ/g] 
Wood 0.015 0.004 20 
Polyurethane 0.22 0.04 27 
 
5.2.1.1. Fire Alarm Activation 
 Fire alarm activation was determined using the unmodified HRR curve for this design. Activation 
criteria for the smoke detection system’s temperature rise assumed an average temperature rise between 
wood and polyurethane as shown in NFPA 72 Table 4.7.5.3 for scattering (photoelectric smoke detectors) 
temperature rise. The resulting plot of the temperature rise for the model is in Figure 29 and the input and 
output data is shown in Table 21. The smoke detector was calculated to activate at 348 seconds when the 
HRR was 359kW. The HRR which the smoke detector activated is much lower than the calculated peak 
HRR of the design fire. This early activation will help in protecting the premises allowing for the arrival of 
the fire department during the developing stages of the fire. 
 







Figure 29. Resulting temperature curve of the ceiling jet temperature rise next to the adjacent smoke detector as well as the 
activation temperature rise for the lecture room design fire. 
Table 21. Important input and output data from the smoke detector activation model for the lecture room design fire. 
Activation Time 348 [s] 
Activation HRR 359 [kW] 
Distance to Detector 21 [ft] 
Ceiling Height 10.5 [ft] 
Temperature rise 





5.2.1.2. Structural Analysis 
 In this design fire the structural member of interest was the gypsum hourly rated wall that separates 
this space from an adjacent vertical shaft that connects all floors of the building. The protection intent of 
this fire rated wall is to prevent the fire from entering the vertical shaft and exposing occupants do not 
intimate with the fire to any hazard. The location of the shaft and the fire can be seen below in Figure 30 


































Figure 30. Screenshot of the second floor of building B and C of the CIC showing the location of the fire and the vertical rated 
shaft of interest 
  For the calculations it will be assumed for the boundary conditions of the hourly rated wall-side 
that is exposed to the fire will heat up by both radiation and convection from the hot gases in the space and 
have an assumed convection coefficient of 20 [W/m2 K]. The interior shaft space will be lumped together 
to find a lumped thermal resistance with an assumed convection coefficient of 10 [W/m2 K] and a boundary 
condition of 20°C. For the interior shaft portion of the wall both radiation and convection will be considered.  
The 1-hour rated gypsum wallboard wall as seen in Appendix S was studied. The boundary conditions 
mentioned in mentioned in Section 5.2 of this report were used along with the material properties as listed 
in Table 34 for type x gypsum wallboard. The calculation method for determining the wallboard 
temperature overview is listed below. 
1. Using the 2-zone model find the gas temperature of the smoke layer with respect to time 
2. Using the 1-D finite difference model with the boundary conditions mentioned in Section 5.2 of 
this report calculate the temperature in the gypsum wall board with respect to time 
3. Using a failure temperature of 139 degrees Celsius for the back surface of the wall as in accordance 
to ASTM E-119 Section 8.3.4.3 the failure time was found [7]. 
For the 1-D finite difference method model used in this analysis, the thermal resistance of the air inside 
the shaft was modeled being lumped together and a convection coefficient of 10 [w/m^2 K] was assumed. 
This interior convection coefficient number was chosen as it is higher than most natural convection which 
would be the mode of heat transfer within the wall. For a more accurate solution the convection coefficient 
must be considered at every time step as it changes with temperature. 
Results for the failure times for this wall in a standard fire along with the design fire for both a 1-hour 
and 2-hour rated wall assembly can be seen in the Table 22 below. 




Fire and Adjacent 
Rated Shaft of 
Interest 






Analysis method Failure Time [s] 
ASTM E-119 with 1 hour rated wall 625 
Design Fire with 1 hour rated wall 458 
Design Fire with 2 hour rated wall 691 
 
The 1 hour rated wall lasts for a shorter period in the design fire scenario than in the ASTM E-119 
test by 167 seconds. This is a 27% reduction in time to failure according to the ASTM E-119 method of the 
back-surface temperature reaching 139 Celsius. This is due to the failure criteria chosen. As mentioned 
earlier the purpose of this wall is to prevent smoke from entering the vertical shaft. The entire vertical shaft 
is lined with 1 hour rated walls so when the fire breaks into the shaft it must also cause another 1-hour rated 
wall to fail before compartments on other floors of this structure are affected. When this is taken into 
consideration the factor of safety can be assumed greater than 1 due to these conservative assumptions, but 
further analysis would need to be performed to quantify the explicit factor of safety. 
Recommended additional protection could include increasing the thermal resistance of the wall. 
This could be accomplished simply by adding another layer of gypsum wallboard. Before doing modifying 
the existing structure this calculation should be verified with more detailed analysis such as using FDS and 
SAFIR to determine an ASET to then compare to an RSET from egress calculations. 
 
5.2.2. Design Fire 2 - Sofa in Exit Corridor of Building B  
 This design fire was selected based upon NFPA 101 design fire scenario 2 in which there is an 
ultra-fast developing fire causing a reduction in the means of egress. This design fire was selected to be in 
a corridor of the faculty portion of the building in building A on the second floor. The sofa midway through 
the corridor was selected as the starting point for this design fire. This sofa is directly across from a large 
conference room (can be seen on left side of Figure 31 D) with only 1 exit and it is through the corridor. 
This corridor also has two exits for means of egress. The sofa in the corridor can be seen in Figure 31 D) 
and the bookshelf adjacent to the sofa and the conference room can be seen below. More photos of the 
adjacent conference room including the location of the design fire on a simple map, the bookshelf, and the 
rest of the corridor can be seen in Figure 31. 
  








A) Book shelf adjacent to sofa. The sofa is directly 
around the corner of the book shelf 
B) Conference room adjacent to sofa. The entrance to the 




C) Photo of the second exit in the corridor on the second 
floor.  




E) Location of the design fire shown with a red box 
 
 Figure 31. This Figure shows various pictures of the furniture and layout of the corridor on the second floor of building A. 
 The sofa was not assumed to be a TB-133 compliant sofa as in the future someone might replace 
the sofa or add other furniture that is not TB-133 compliant as well as for the purpose of modeling an ultra-
fast developing fire. The only fuel loads considered in this design fire where the sofa and the adjacent 






bookshelf. The HRR curve used for the sofa can be seen in Figure 32 and the HRR curve used for the 
bookshelf can be seen in Figure 33 (the bookshelf uses the 3-shelf wooden bookshelf with files). 
 
Figure 32. HRR curve for a sofa that is comprised of a wood frame, California foam (polyurethane) polyolefin fabric (mixture of 
polyethylene and polypropylene) [3]. 
 
Figure 33. HRR curve from 2016 SFPE Handbook 2016 Figure 26.17 page 816 of book [8]. 
 The resulting design fire HRR for this corridor can be seen in Figure 34 below. It can be seen 
from the graphs that the compartment barely reaches flashover conditions, and that sprinkler activation 
reduces the maximum HRR by nearly half. The overview of the results of Figure 34 can be seen in Table 
23. 







A) Final un-modified HRR curve not 
accounting for flashover or sprinkler 
activation conditions 
 
B) The modified HRR curve accounting 
for sprinkler activation 
 
C) The modified HRR curve accounting 
for flashover conditions 
 Figure 34. The resulting HRR curves from the design fire produced for the corridor in building A. A critical heat flux value of 
10 [kW/m2] was used for determining the time of ignition of the wooden bookcase. The horizontal distance a of 5 meters was 
used to determine when a sprinkler would activate.  







Table 23. Notable data from the HRR curves in Figure 34. 
HRR Curve Maximum HRR [kW] Time of Occurrence [s] Burn out time [s] 
Unmodified HRR Curve 3892 N/A 700 
Sprinkler Activation 1767 140 806 
Flashover 3078 276 530 
 
 The second item to ignite (the bookshelf) was found to ignite after 50 seconds which occurs before 
sprinkler activation and flashover occurs in the model that was used. It was also assumed that the bookshelf 
was in full view of the of the sofa when determining the incident heat flux on the bookshelf from the sofa. 
This was a conservative assumption as the bookshelf is around a corner in and is not in full view of the 
sofa. 
 The design fire for this situation used a much more conservative HRR curve for the sofa compared 
to what is called for in an exit corridor space the sofa is located in. Under the California Building Code it 
is required that only TB-133 compliant furniture be placed in this location. TB-133 compliant furniture has 
a maximum HRR of 80 kW which is 2 orders of magnitude smaller than the maximum HRR of a typical 
plush sofa HRR curve that was used and can be seen in Figure 32. This conservative estimate was done 
incase more furniture is added or if the current TB-133 compliant sofa gets replaced with a regular sofa.  
 This design fire also assumed that the fire strategy of compartmentation would hold and that the 
fire would not break into the adjacent rooms. If a door is to be left open during the event of a fire in this 
location the ventilation factors can change which in turn will affect the flashover HRR rate and allow the 
fire to grow larger if more fuel is available. 
 If this space is limited to having fuel that has a maximum HRR of 80 [kW] (a fire which only one  
TB-133 compliant piece of furniture is ignited) then sprinkler activation and flashover will not occur for 
this space. It would be in the best interest to ensure that all of the furniture in this portion of the building is 
TB-133 compliant as this is an exit corridor for people throughout the 2nd floor of building A. It was also 
found during a walkthorugh that the door at the end of the hallway in figure 31 C was locked and would 
prevent egress.  
 The materials assumed to be present in this design fire are presented in Table 24 below. If further 
modeling was completed in FDS to compare to tenability conditions the material information will be 
needed.  
Table 24. List of materials burned in the exit corridor of building A and the soot yield concentration factors from the different 
items [3,9]. Polyolefin Fabric is a combination of both polyethylene and polypropylene. The higher value between the two 
materials were selected and are presented below. 
Fuel Soot Yield [g/g] CO Yield [g/g] ∆𝑯𝒄 [KJ/g] 
Wood 0.015 0.004 20 
Polyurethane (California Foam) 0.22 0.04 27 
Polyolefin Fabric 0.6 0.24 43.6 
 
5.2.2.1. Fire Alarm Activation 
Using the unmodified HRR curve for this design fire the time for activation of a smoke detector 
was calculated. Activation criteria for the smoke detection system’s temperature rise assumed an average 






temperature rise between wood and polyurethane as shown in NFPA 72 Table 4.7.5.3 for scattering 
(photoelectric smoke detectors) temperature rise. The resulting plot of the temperature rise for the model is 
in Figure 35 and the input and output data is shown in Table 25. The activation time of the smoke detector 
was found to be at 56 seconds. This is a very quick response time along with the HRR at the time of 
activation (200kW).  
 
 
Figure 35. Resulting temperature curve of the ceiling jet temperature rise next to the adjacent smoke detector as well as the 
activation temperature rise for the sofa design fire. 
Table 25. Important input and output data from the smoke detector activation model for the sofa design fire. 
Activation Time 56 [s] 
Activation HRR 200 [kW] 
Distance to Detector 12 [ft] 
Ceiling Height 905 [ft] 
Temperature rise 




5.2.3. Design Fire 3 - Conference Room Building A 
 This design fire was selected based upon NFPA 101 design fire scenario 8 in which ordinary 
combustible materials are present and the fire protection systems are ineffective. The intent of this design 
fire to observe the effects on the exposed structural elements within the space. The space selected is a 
conference room on the first floor of building A shown in Figure 36 below.  The conference room has 
exposed structural members that do not have any fire resistance protection. This creates a point of interest 






































A) Location of the design 




B) 1 of 2 images for the 




C) Second image for the 
space of the design 
fire looking back to 
the location the first 
picture was taken.  
  
Figure 36. Pictures taken of the room for this design fire scenario along with a small map legend showing the location of the 
design fire within the building.  
 Several different HRR curves were used in the creation of this design fire. HRR data was taken 
from the SFPE Handbook [3]. These HRR curves were selected as they most accurately represented the 
objects in this space. Figures 37-39 shows screen shots of the HRR curves taken from their respective 
sources. 







Figure 37. SFPE Handbook Figure 26.81[3] HRR of plastic house plants. 
 
Figure 38. SFPE Handbook Figure 26.39 [3] HRR of a wooden desk with the dimensions OF 1.2 m by 6 m. 







Figure 39. Plush Chair [6]. The materials that this chair is made of is polypropylene foam frame, urethane foam, and polyolefin 
fabric. 
 The layout of the of the space that was used in the model to produce the resulting HRR curves 
(Figure 41) as can be seen below in Figure 39. The large conference room Table was assumed to be make 
of 6 smaller wooden desk tables as large conference Table HRR data could not be found. 







Figure 40. Room layout and numbering used to create this design fire. Along with a legend showing the distance to all items 
considered in this design fire. This drawing is not to scale and is just to give the reader the general layout of the space. Some 
distances between groups of objects were assumed to be at the same distance due to the small difference to simplify the 
calculations. 
The activation sequence of the objects for this design fire is straightforward as all objects were 
assumed to have a critical heat flux of 10 [W/m2] as all these items had wood as part of the individual 
objects.  
T-21 






Table 26. Tabulated data for the items to ignite in chronological sequence along with the time of ignition for the layout as seen in 
Figure 39. 





T-1 0 Source of Design Fire 
X-1 114   
X-3, T-2 133   
X-2, X-4 135   
X-5 145   
X-7 152   
X-6 153   
T-3 157   
P-1 167  
T-4 177  
 
  








A) Unmodified HRR curve not 
accounting for sprinkler 
activation or flashover 
conditions 
 
B) The HRR curve accounting for 
sprinkler activation 
 
C) The modified HRR curve for 
flash over 
Figure 41. HRR curves produced for the design fire in the 1st floor conference room in Building A. The HRR curves produced 
for this design fire used a critical heat flux of 10 [kW/m2] for wood which is lower than polyurethane and assumed a sprinkler 

















Time of Occurrence [s] Burn out time [s] 
Unmodified HRR Curve 3,743 N/A 2,353 
Sprinkler Activation 1,752 293 6,164 
Flashover 2,172 301 4,749 
 
Table 28. List of materials burned in the design fire in the 1st floor conference room of building A and the soot yield 
concentration factors from the different fuel packages. From Table A.39 of SFPE Handbook [3]. Polyolefin Fabric is a 
combination of both polyethylene and polypropylene. The higher value between the two materials were selected and are 
presented below [9]. 
Fuel Soot Yield [g/g] CO Yield [g/g] ∆𝑯𝒄 [KJ/g] 
Wood 0.015 0.004 20 
polypropylene foam  0.095 0.017 46 
Urethane Foam 0.113 0.038 28 
Polyolefin Fabric 0.6 0.24 43.6 
5.2.3.1. Fire Alarm Activation 
Using the unmodified HRR curve for this design fire the time for activation of a smoke detector was 
calculated. Activation criteria for the smoke detection system’s temperature rise assumed an average 
temperature rise between wood and polyurethane as shown in NFPA 72 Table 4.7.5.3 for scattering 
(photoelectric smoke detectors) temperature rise. The resulting plot of the temperature rise for the model is 
in Figure 42 and the input and output data is shown in Table 29. 
 
 
Figure 42. Resulting temperature curve of the ceiling jet temperature rise next to the adjacent smoke detector as well as the 
activation temperature rise for the conference room design fire. 































Activation Time 243 [s] 
Activation HRR 257.2 [kW] 
Distance to Detector 12 [ft] 
Ceiling Height 14.5 [ft] 
Temperature-Rise 
from Ambient for 
Activation 
24.45 [C] 
5.2.3.2. Structural Analysis 
 The structural member of interest in this design fire is the exposed lateral bracing for the steel 
columns traveling from the floor to the ceiling of the structure. Failure was determined when the lateral 
brace could no longer support the load it was designed to carry under fire conditions. 
 For this analysis it will be assumed that all sides will be exposed to the same external temperature 
as found by the smoke layer temperature in a 2-zone model. Heating effects of both convection and radiation 
will be accounted for in the 1-dimensional finite difference model. 
The model inputs for the material properties for steel can be seen in Table 34 and the geometric 
properties for the member of interest for this design fire can be seen in Table 30. For hand calculations 
related to this problem that were used to determine the axial load on the member of interest see Appendix 
T. A step-by-step calculation method is listed below for how the results were reached. 
1. A 2-zone model to determine smoke layer temperature,  
2. A 1-dimensional finite difference model to determine the steel member temperature. 
3. Material property equations to account for the change of yield strength and elastic modulus 
with respect to temperature.  
4. Structural mechanic equations for a simply supported beam determining the moment capacity 
and the maximum deflection to compare to the applied moment. 
 
Table 30. Geometric properties of the member that was analyzed for the conference room design fire. 
Property Value 
Pipe 8-inch nominal standard steel pipe [8STD] 
Outer Diameter [in] 8.625 
Inner Diameter [in] 7.981 
Area Moment of Inertia [in^4] 72.5 
Section Modulus [in^3] 16.8 
Cross Sectional area of material [in^2] 8.4 
Radius of Gyration [in] 2.94 
 
Upon completion of the analysis for the lateral bracing it was found that the time to failure for the 
design fire created was about 4.5 minutes. This fast failure time is due to the member not having a 
method/insulation to protect it from heating up very quickly. The other reason for having a fast failure time 
for this member is due to the ventilation openings used for the design fire allowing for flashover in this 
compartment to occur rather quickly at around 300 seconds.  If a window is assumed to be 1.5 meters away 
from the source of the fire a heat flux of 12 [kw/m2] would be experienced by the window at 280 seconds 
and a heat flux of 23 [kw/m2] would be experienced at the predicted time of flash over. These heat fluxes 
are large enough to break the glass in the conference room as it has been found experimentally that glass 






breaks around a heat flux of about 12.5 [kw/m2] [10]. Taking the breaking of the glass in the compartment 
into account, the ventilation will be affect greatly which in turn affects the flash over HRR. The flashover 
HRR could be increased due to window breaking so much that flashover may never occur preventing the 
compartment from experiencing the high temperatures as predicted by the Thomas plot. For all failure times 
calculated, see Table 31. 
 
Table 31. Approximate failure times for all the setups that were accounted for the exposed steel member in the conference room 
of building A of the CIC.  
Analysis method Approximate Failure Time [min] 
ASTM E-119 Time Temperature Curve 3.5 
Design Fire with no protective insulation 4.5 
Design Fire with 0.05 m thick protective 
insulation 
Does not Fail 
 
This member was then compared to the ASTM E-119 temperature curve to determine if there was 
any difference in failure time [7]. It was found that failure while using this time temperature curve occurred 
around 3.5 minutes which 22% earlier than the design fire that was created. This again does not account for 
possible windows breaking as mentioned earlier. This safety factor number looks good on paper, but when 
the failure time of this structural member is compared to the required safe time for egress of this building 
it provides a safety factor of less than 1. As mentioned earlier this does not account for windows breaking 
changing the maximum temperature the compartment experiences or the fact that there are redundant 
supports in the structure. By having redundant supports even if this member was to fail building collapse 
or partial collapse would most likely not occur. 
The recommended protection would be to insulate the exposed structural members in some way 
(intumescent paint, spray on insulation or type X gypsum wallboard). Further analysis was performed by 
adding on spray 0.05 meters on insulation to the structural member with the material properties listed in 
Table 32. It was found that the steel only reaches a temperature of 313 degrees Celsius at the time of burn 
out for this fire at 4,750 seconds. This temperature is still approximately 200 degrees Celsius lower than 
that of the temperature needed for this member to fail. By adding insulation, the factor of safety is greatly 
increased, and failure may never be seen unless larger fuel loads are added to this space. 
Further analysis should be performed using a computer software such as SAFIR to account for the 
connection point of the lateral bracing to the vertical column(I-beam). This connect point is at ceiling height 
where the maximum temperature due would be expected. As well affects from the thermal conductivity of 
the steel structural members could act as a heat sink for the exposed portions reducing the actual 
temperature.  
5.2.4. Design Fire 4 - Simpson High Bay 
 This design fire was originally selected based on NFPA 101 criteria for design fire scenario 7. This 
design fire scenario accounts for an outside exposure fire blocking escape and spreading to the building. 
This was selected before it was known that the CIC and the SHB are considered as 1 building. However, 
the CIC was originally designed as separate buildings and would have required a one-hour exterior fire 
resistance rating to have a building within 10ft of the exterior (the SHB is approximately 8ft away). The 
proximity of the CIC to the SHB is shown in Figure 43.  The source of this design fire will be a small-scale 
house project built by students which can be seen in Figure 44. 









Figure 43. Images showing the location and the proximity of the SHB to the CIC. The distance from the walkway of the CIC to 
the exterior wall of the SHB is approximately 8ft. 
 
  






Figure 44. Images of the typical student project within the Simpson High Bay. 
 The experimental HRR curve found for this design fire was taken from a full scale cross laminated 
timber compartment fire test as researched for NFPA [11]. The compartment interior dimensions where 9.1 
meters by 4.6 meters by 2.7 meters high. During the burn test the opening of the compartment was 1.8 
meters wide by 2 meters high. In the test all CLT surfaces on the walls and ceiling were fully protected so 
the CLT structure would neither contribute to the compartment fire nor develop char during the test to be 
reused for future tests. Figure 45 shows the resulting HRR curve for the single compartment and Figure 46 
shows images of the fire test components and layout.  
 
 
Figure 45.  HRR curve for a large cross laminated structure that could be built within the SHB [11]. 







Figure 46. Image of the space that was burned and the heat release rate is going to be used for this design fire [11]. 
 No further analysis was performed to find a new modified HRR curve as the structure found from 
test data is much larger than what students build for projects as seen in Figure 44. Even though the SHBis 
fully sprinklered it is assumed that the sprinkler system will not activate to provide for the worst-case 
scenario. As well, due to the large openings within the SHB it is assumed that it will not reach flashover 
conditions to provide again for the worst case (highest HRR) scenario on building B of the CIC.  More 
background on the SHB is provided in Section 5.2.4.1 of this report. 
 Table 32 below shows the possible materials that could be ignited during a fire of a student project 
in the SHB. Wood is going to be the largest contributor to fuel, but some of these projects include pipping 
for teaching students about pluming so values were also provided for PVC. 
 






Fuel Soot Yield [g/g] CO Yield [g/g] ∆𝑯𝒄 [KJ/g] 
Wood 0.015 0.004 20 
PVC 0.023 0.063 18 






5.2.4.1. Simpson High Bay background info 
 To give the reader some background on the Simpson High Bay (SHB) a bulleted list is provided 
below on the general building elements and fire protection features within the building. As well the egress 
drawing from the SHB drawings are shown in Figure 47. 
 
• Type IIB 
• Fully Sprinklered 
• Class B Occupancy 
• Building and A, B, C, and SHB considered as one building, allowable area IBC §503.1.2 
• Height: 30ft 
• Heavy Timber 
• Egress 
• One of two exits on mezzanine uses Construction Innovation Center (CIC) 
• Non-Combustible Exterior South Wall 
• Alarm 
• Same as CIC for hardware 
• “Fully automatic and independent system interfaced with campus wide system”  
• Quote from drawings 







Figure 47. Screenshot from the SHB drawings showing one of the 2 paths of egress from the mezzanine in the SHB exiting onto 
the walkway on the second floor of the CIC. This drawing is not an as built drawing and appears to come from early schematic 
design or concept design phase of design. This would explain why the arrows and dotted lines do not make sense for egress. 
 
5.2.4.2. Structural Analysis 
 The structural member that will be analyzed will be the exposed I-beam used to support the outdoor 
walkway between the SHB and building B of the CIC. Failure was not found to occur even though the 
member is exposed. The failure criteria used was to find the time in which the member reached a 
temperature that it could no longer support the design load. The temperature of the I-beam only marginally 
increased.  
 In the hand calculations it was assumed that design fire will not reach flashover, to provide for the 
worst-case scenario incident heat flux on the member of interest. As well, it is assumed that until the glass 
breaks on the SHB that there will be no imposed heat flux on the member. It was found some glass facades 
break at a critical heat flux of 12.6 [kw/m2] [10]. This heat flux was achieved in this design fire at 1036 
seconds.  
 







Figure 48. Space orientation between the design fire from the experiment that is being used in the SHB. This orientation is used 
to show the distances used in calculations to determine the when the glass in the SHB breaks along with the distance to use in 
calculations to the exterior exposed member on the walkway of building B of the CIC. Note that this is not to scale. 
 This member is approximately 20ft distance away from the source of the design fire (shown in 
Figure 48) so the heat due to the design fire will only consider radiation as it is very unlikely for convection 
to play a major role in the heating of this member. Only one side of this member is exposed to the design 
fire while the other side is in contact with the concrete. This contact with the concrete acting as a heat sink 
will be neglected. 
For analyzing the I beam that makes up the exterior walkway on building B of the CIC that faces the 
SHB the assumptions mentioned in Section 5.2 of this report were used. The calculation methods used in 
order are listed below and input information to these models can be seen in Tables 33 and 34. 
1. Given the HRR of the fire the radiation incident heat flux with respect to time was determined on 
the glass 
2. After the incident heat flux on the glass reached the critical heat flux the glass was assumed to no 
longer block radiation to the structural member of interest. 
3. Using a 1-d finite difference method model found the temperature in the steel I-beam with respect 
to time 






4. Using the centerline temperature, the effect of the moment capacity was calculated.  
After following the analysis process mentioned in the list above it was found that the temperature of 
the exposed unprotected member did not rise even a degree Celsius. This shows that the structure of the 
CIC is not affected at all for this design fire scenario. No further analysis was completed on this member 
(including adding fire resistive insulation or comparing the results to the ASTM E 119 temperature curve) 
due to the design fire having negligible effects. 
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It was found that the temperature of the steel did not rise more than a degree Celsius. This test was 
not compared to a furnace test for this scenario as only radiation was accounted for from the design fire due 
to the distance this member was away from the design fire. It is important to take into account that this hand 
calculation takes into account the radiation portion of the design fire. Convective portions of the design fire 
would need to be considered for the convection portion of heat transfer for a more complete analysis.  
5.2.4.3. FDS Results 
 Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) was used to model this design fire further. The intent of the FDS 
model was not to look at the effects on the structural components of the CIC (as they were found to be 
negligible), but rather the effects on tenability of occupants in building B as the occupants in building B 
must walk across the walkway adjacent to the SHB to evacuate.  First the tenability criteria used in this 
analysis will be discussed along with the reasoning behind the values selected. Then the critical heat flux 
on the SHB and the CIC will be discussed, follow by the results to compare to the tenability criteria to 
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The tenability analysis will be based upon method 1 in the life safety code to avoid exposing 
occupants to untenable conditions. Method 1 in the life safety code allows for the performance criteria to 
be set by the design team to ensure that the occupants are not incapacitated by fire effects [14]. The 
tenability design criteria that were selected is shown in the Table 35 below. 
 
Table 35. Tabulated values for the different tenability criteria along with their reference from the 5th edition of the SFPE 
Handbook Chapter 63 [3]. 
Tenability criteria Value References [3] 
Temperature [C] 120 Table 63.17 
Heat Flux [kW/m^2] 2.5 Table 63.19 
Carbon Monoxide [ppm min] 3,000 Table 63.9 
Visibility [m] 10 Table 63.5 
 
The tenability criteria shown in Table 35 above is based upon the value which considers 
incapacitation. Where a range was given for incapacitation the more conservative value was selected as to 
account for occupants that are more sensitive to toxic fire products even though most occupants in this 
building are young and healthy which puts them at lower risk to be affected by fire products. The relative 
graphs from the SFPE Handbook showing the time related aspect is shown in Figure 49 below. Red mark-
ups have been provided at the criteria selected. To be conservative, it will be assumed that the environment 
will no longer be tenable if any of the criteria in Table 35 are reached at any point in time.  
The visibility criteria was selected from SFPE Handbook Table 63.5 & Table 61.4 (Rasbash) which 
provides 10m as the suggested tenability limit for buildings with large enclosures and travel distances. 
Considering that the travel distances can be great from building B of the CIC this value was selected as it 
is more conservative than what is suggested for small enclosures and travel distances (5m). 
  








A) Heat Flux B) Temperature 
  
 
C) Carbon Monoxide 
Figure 49. Images from the SFPE Handbook showing graphs relating to the tenability criteria selected [3]. These graphs are 
shown as the tenability criteria selected do not in all occupants cause immediate incapacitation, but rather depend upon exposure 
time.  
 The carbon monoxide criteria selected is dependent upon time and concentration hence the units 
[ppm min]. It will be assumed that incapacitation will occur immediately (environment becomes untenable) 
if the CO concentration ever reaches 3,000ppm. 
 
 






5.2.4.3.2. Critical Heat Flux Results 
  To briefly verify one of the key factors in the structural analysis the incident heat flux on 
the SHB was modeled. The largest incident heat flux was found at the peak HRR of the design fire. This is 
expected as at the peak HRR the fire will have the largest radiation output. The design fire in FDS was 
modeled as being 15ft by 30ft as shown in Figure 47 rather than a point source used in the hand calculations. 
The resulting incident heat flux on the SHB wall was not found to exceed 4 [kW/m2]. This is shown in 
Figure 50 below.  
 
Figure 50. Screen shot of FDS results for the incident heat flux at its maximum on the SHB wall. 
 
 Based upon the previous research mentioned on glass breaking around 12 [kW/m2] the glass would 
not break [10]. However, since this research is limited in its scope further FDS modeling will be performed 
assuming there is an opening in the location of the maximum incident heat flux from the time of ignition 
along with assuming a smaller area for the design fire (1 square meter) located 12ft away from the interior 
wall of the SHB. The change in dimensional size and location of the design fire is to provide for the highest 
incident heat flux on the CIC that can be obtained. The opening used in the SHB can be seen below in 
Figure 51. The opening is 4 meters wide and 2.5 meters wide resulting in a total opening area of 10 square 
meters. Figure 51 also shows the FDS burner through the opening.  
 







Figure 51. Screenshot of the opening modeled in the SHB. The orientation of this screenshot was taken as if you were standing 
on the walkway of building B of the CIC facing the SHB.  
 
5.2.4.3.3. Tenability Results 
 The resulting FDS slice files shown in this Section are presented at the instant in which the most 
hazardous conditions are present to the occupant. These conditions were found to correlate with the 
maximum HRR time of the design fire (~1,000 seconds). 
 The first tenability criteria which will be reviewed is the incident heat flux on the CIC. It was found 
that the incident heat flux on the CIC reached only approximately 1.5 [kW/m2] This was found near the 
peak HRR of the design fire. Further it is within the tenability criteria for heat flux. Therefore, in terms of 
heat flux the occupants in building B will never experience untenable conditions. A screenshot of the 
maximum incident heat flux on building B of the CIC can be seen in Figure 52 below. 
 
 







Figure 52. FDS screen shot of results for the incident heat flux on building B of the CIC. This was taken at approximately 1000 
seconds into the simulation which is near the peak HRR of the design fire. 
 
 The next step at verifying if the environment will become untenable was to look at the temperature 
occupants could experience. Two screen shots of FDS temperature slice files are shown below in Figures 
53-54. The maximum value in the slice file was set to 120°C to clearly show regions which experience any 
temperature that will make the environment untenable. Figures 53-54 show the highest temperatures 
experience throughout the simulation and at no time does the temperature on the walkway exceed 120°C. 
Therefore, the environment will be tenable throughout the duration of this design fire. 







Figure 53. Slice file from FDS showing the temperature along the middle of the walkway of the CIC. This was taken at what was 
found to be the highest temperature throughout the simulation. This was found close to the peak HRR of the design fire.  
 
Figure 54. Screen shot taken from FDS showing a slice temperature file going through the middle of the hole from the SHB to the 
walkway of building B. 






 The third criteria analyzed for occupant tenability is the carbon monoxide concentration. Two 
resulting FDS slice files are presented in Figures 55-56. Two different orientation are provided one through 
the center of the walkway of the CIC and the other through the center of the opening in the SHB. The scale 
of the slice file was not modified for two reasons. The first being that it is in different units than the tenability 
criteria and the second is because the maximum CO concentration was several orders of magnitude away 
from the criteria selected.  
 The CO concentration is reported in Mole of CO over Mole of air. The conversion to ppm is simply 
to multiply or divide by 10e-6. The tenability criteria of 3,000ppm converts to 0.003 (3e-3) Mole of CO 
over Mole of air (Mole/Mole in FDS output). 
 
Figure 55. Screen shot from FDS showing building B of the CIC in a slice file of the CO concentration.  







Figure 56. Screen shot from FDS showing the CO volume fraction slice file for carbon monoxide concentration. This slice file 
was taken after the peak HRR as around this time the greatest concentration of CO was calculated. 
 
 The final criteria evaluated on the walkway of the CIC was the visibility. Four beam detectors were 
placed across the 2nd and 3rd floor walkway 6ft above the walking surface. The beam detectors are shown 
in Figure 57 below. 
 







Figure 57. Screenshot from Pyrosim showing the FDS model. This screenshot has 8 yellow lines above the walking surface on 
the 2nd and 3rd floor of the building B of the CIC. These yellow lines are the beam detectors that were used in the model. 
Using the percent obscuration from the beam detectors the visibility distance in meters was found with 
respect to time for each one of the beam detectors. The visibility distance was based upon a non-light 
emitting sign in accordance with the FDS user manual.  It was found that on the 3rd floor the visibility was 
limited to 10m at a time of 1238 seconds (20.6min). It was assumed that this time would be the available 
safe time for egress (ASET).  
5.2.4.3.4. Egress 
 This Section of the report details the total building evacuation of the CIC using both hand 
calculations from the SFPE Handbook as well as computer modeling software (MassMotion). Total 






building evacuation was selected as it would provide the most onerous RSET value. First the occupant 
characteristics will be discussed to provide reasoning behind the selection of the modeling input parameters. 
Then the modeling results will be discussed and an ASET value will be determined.  
5.2.4.3.4.1. Occupant characteristics 
The type of the occupants likely to be present for most of the life of the CIC will comprise of students 
attending lectures and offices for professors and the construction department at Cal Poly.  Characteristics 
of these types’ of occupants are listed below and categorized similarly to categories listed in Chapter 57 of 
the 5th edition of the SFPE Handbook [3].  
1. Age 
a. Mostly 18-25 years old with exceptions for professors which age range can vary greatly. 
Age may also vary for other events held in the building such as the Construction 
Management College commencement ceremony. 
2. Cognitive Abilities 
a. Occupants will be mostly cognitively alert as activities in this building occur during 
business hours which occupants will be awake. 
3. Disabilities 
a. Occupants within the CIC could possibly have a range of disabilities as the population this 
building serve is constantly changing between classes. Possible disabilities could include 
i. Occupants limited to wheelchairs 
ii. Occupants with limited site abilities 
iii. Occupants with limited hear abilities 
4. Social Groups 
a. Students in classes have a high chance of having other friends in the lecture. These social 
groupings can greatly affect how rapidly occupants respond and evacuate. 
5. Role 
a. Students will most likely to look to professors for direction in the event of a real fire. 
6. Trained/untrained 
a. Professors should be familiar with the building’s emergency planning, alarms, procedures, 
and emergency exit plans. Instances could occur where professors do not know these things 
about the building or have forgotten as there are so many buildings on Cal Poly’s campus 
which professors can hold classes. 
b. Students are mostly familiar with the building if they have had prior classes in the building. 
Students that have not had a class in this building would most likely not know the 
emergency planning, alarms, and procedures associated with this building.  
7. Permanent/transitory 
a. Most students are probably not familiar with emergency planning and procedures for this 
building as students likely do not care about learning this information.  
b. Professors can also be unfamiliar with the building if they are new to Cal Poly or rarely 
teach classes in this building. 
8. Population numbers and density 
a. The population size of the occupants will not exceed 50 occupants in each space as that is 
what is required by code for the building to be classified as Group B occupancy. 
b. The density of the occupants will most likely not exceed 1 person per every 20 square feet. 
This is the maximum floor area allowed per occupant for educational classroom areas. This 
is a higher density of occupants than business areas at 1 person per 100 square feet. 
9. Distribution and activities 






a. The activities of the occupants of this building will be attending/giving lectures along with 
business activities associated with running the College of Construction and professor 
offices. 
5.2.4.3.4.2. Pre-movement Times 
The pre-movement time is defined as the time when occupants are notified till the time when 
occupants start to evacuate or take the appropriate action that leads to evacuation [3]. A diagram from the 
SFPE Handbook showing the timeline for egress is shown in Figure 58 below. The diagram encompasses 
more than just the pre-movement time including ignition and alarm activation. 
 
Figure 58. Figure 58.1 from the SFPE Handbook showing an event timeline for egress [3].  
 
Taking into consideration the occupant characteristics the pre-movement time is going to be 
assumed to be 4.5 minutes [15]. A photo out of the Egress Design Solutions textbook can be seen in the 
Figure 59 below along with an explanation for the selection of the pre-movement time [15].  
 







Figure 59. Table of the pre-movement times from the Egress Design Solutions Textbook [15] 
Since the CIC is not required to have a voice communication system or a pre-recorded message per 
the IBC the W3 column will be used in the Figure 59 above. The first row in the Figure 59 above will be 
used as well as it relates to colleges and schools. The occupant delay time (pre-movement time) is shown 
to be greater than 4 minutes. To be conservative the pre-movement time is going to be assumed to be 4.5 
minutes. This is a reasonable assumption as the occupants within this building will be alert and have a 
familiarity with the building in most cases. In the cases where occupants are not familiar with the building 
professors or other people familiar with the building will be able to assist in directing egress. 
5.2.4.3.4.3. SFPE Hand Calculation for Egress 
The performance-based egress hand calculation was performed based upon the First-Order Hydraulic 
Model outlined in Chapter 59 of the 5th edition of the SFPE Handbook [3]. This model takes an approach 
focusing on the component that places the most severe constraint on the flow of people and uses this 
constraint to determine the movement time. The assumptions with this model that were used for the CIC 
are shown below.  
• It is assumed that all occupants begin evacuation at the same time. 
• Occupants are evenly dispersed between evacuation stairs. 
• Occupants will assume to be at the most efficient density (people per area) for the fastest movement 
time of the most people across the limiting egress component. 
• 6-inch boundary layer on each side of the stairs. 
• All stairs are 5 feet wide (one stair is wider than 5 feet). 
• Pre-movement time as mentioned earlier is 4.5 minutes from alarm activation. 
• Alarm activation occurs after 60 seconds from ignition. 






• From alarm activation to occupant notification is 10 seconds per NFPA 72 [5]. 
• Ground floor occupants egress time is longer than that of occupants on the 3rd floor 
The CIC has exterior corridors between rooms and exterior stairs. The stairs are not enclosed and do 
not have a door entrance to the exit stairs. The corridors are wider than the stairs so the limited egress 
component for evacuation will be the stairs. The calculated flow capacity is calculated by multiplying the 
maximum specific flow (found in Table 59.5 of the SFPE Handbook) by the effective width [3]. Equations 
showing the calculation of the effective width and the calculated flow capacity can be seen below. 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ − 2 ∗ 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 (5.10) 
𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ (5.11) 
 
The effective width of the stairs was found to be 4 ft, the specific flow used from the SFPE 
Handbook for stairs was 18.5 [persons/min/ft], and the calculated flow capacity was found to be 75 
[persons/min] [3].  
Dividing the number of occupants above the 1st floor per exit stair (803 occupants or 281 occupants 
per exit stair) by the calculated flow capacity gives the time for all occupants to pass through the stairs (3 
minutes). This time does not account for the time for the first occupant to reach the stairs, however due to 
the probable proximity of occupants to each stair this time is assumed negligible. 
Adding the alarm activation time, alarm notification time, the pre-movement time, and the 
calculated time for occupants to pass through the stairs it was found that the total egress time for the building 
using the model was found to be approximately 10 minutes. Using 10 minutes as the required safe time for 
egress (RSET) the factor of safety is found to be approximately 2 when compared to the ASET of the SHB 
design fire. Equation 5.12 shows an equation based on time periods during evacuation as shown in figure 
57. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 
=   (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
+ (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)




This calculation was performed again but using only 2 exits which the occupants were assumed to 
be evenly split between. This has 331 occupants per stair well which brings the calculated flow capacity to 
4.5 minutes and the total time for egress to 11.5 minutes with no factor of safety. Apply the same ASET 
(20 min) from the SHB design fire a 1.73 factor of safety was found.  
The hand calculations previously discussed do not include the occupant load from the SHB of 43 
people which may use the CIC stairs to exit. Using the same method as shown in equations 5.10 and 5.11 
the additional occupants increase the ASET to approximately 11 minutes reducing the factor of safety to 
1.8. 






5.2.4.3.5. Computer-based egress model 
 Mass Motion was used to model the evacuation of the CIC. Upon making the Mass Motion model 
the following assumptions were made. 
1. The occupant loads calculated from the prescriptive occupant loads as seen in Appendix E were 
used. 
2. Occupants in building A for the business occupancy were distributed at random throughout the 
spaces on each floor. The total occupant load of the business occupancies of each floor was 
assumed to be the values as shown in Appendix E. 
3. The occupant load for building B and C rooms used what was found from the prescriptive 
analysis. 
4. Occupants for Building B were given a choice between going to any stairs present in the CIC. 
The decision making for what stair occupants would go to was determined by the least cost 
method of the occupants to reach the exit. The least cost method is programed into the Mass 
Motion software. It can be changed; however, research has been performed to determine the set 
values and changing these initial values can have unforeseen consequences on the results of 
models. 
5. Occupants of building A were given the choice between using the stairway directly adjacent to 
building A or the third stair way closest to building A. The decision making for what stair 
occupants would go to was determined by the least cost method of the occupants to reach the exit. 
6. A pre-movement time for all occupants was assumed to be 4.5 minutes. 
7. An average walking speed for occupants of 1.35 meter per second. The walking speed between 
occupants was varied to account for changes in the population from 0.65 to 2.05 meters per 
second. 
8. Occupants were assumed to be evenly spread out among the spaces before evacuation. 
9. It was assumed that occupants begin evacuation simultaneously. 
 
 With these assumptions it was found that the total time for evacuation was approximately 10 
minutes including the pre-movement time. If the time from ignition to notification of occupants is also 
added (same 70 seconds as used in prescriptive analysis) the total time for egress will be approximately 11 
minutes resulting in a factor of safety of 1.8 compared to the SHB design fire. Multiple runs of this 
simulation were performed to account for any variation in egress with occupants. The model was run a total 
of 25 times and the longest time for egress was reported.  
 Comparing the time for egress from the Mass Motion model to the SFPE Handbook first ordered 
hand calculation the differences between the models is 1 min which is not that large of a difference between 
the models especially considering that the time for egress is not as large as some high-rise buildings. As 
well, the occupants of the SHB (43 people) where not included in this analysis.  
 The next step for further analysis in the Mass Motion model will be to eliminate stairs to see how 
greatly the time for evacuation is affected and compare this time to what was calculated by hand for having 
only 2 out of the 3 stairs available. This would need to be done if a design fire was made which blocked 
one of the paths of egress. 
 Further work can be done to account for other short comings of the Mass Motion model by 
accounting for the variables that I assumed such as a constant pre-movement time for all occupants, and 
account for the characteristics of typical occupants within this space.  






 Some of the resulting screenshots of the MassMotion model are provided in the Figures 60-63 
below. In all these screenshots building A is on the left building B is in the middle and building C is on the 
right. The first screen shot is of the occupants before evacuation during the pre-movement time period. 
 
Figure 60. Screenshot of the model during pre-movement. 
 














Figure 62. Screenshot of the model 7 minutes and 30 seconds after the simulation started. Currently the occupants using the stair 
not adjacent, but closest to building A have nearly complete evacuated. 
 
 
Figure 63. Screenshot showing when occupants using the stair adjacent to building A have nearly completely evacuated at just 
after 8 minutes. As you can see in this screenshot the limiting factor for egress is the number of occupants using the stairs in 

















5.2.4.3.5.1. Simpson High Bay Design Fire Conclusion 
 Upon providing the detailed calculations and modeling for this design fire the RSET was found at 
1238 seconds due to limited visibility on the 3rd floor walkway. This is conservative as it accounted for 
when the visibility was reduced at the edge of the walkway. Then considering an ASET of 11min a factor 
of safety of 1.8 was found for this design fire and a total building evacuation. The factor of safety could be 
increased if only the occupants from building B were considered for their time to reach safety away from 
the hazards of the SHB design fire.   
5.2.5. Performance Based Design Conclusion 
 The performance-based analysis portion of this report described the calculation method for which 
design fires were created based upon test data and discussed 4 realistic design fire scenarios. Three of the 
four scenarios discussed only went as far as performing hand calculations which would require future 
computer modeling to verify these calculations. The final design fire number 4 for the Simpson High Bay 
was discussed in detail as computer modeling was completed using FDS which were then coupled with the 
evacuation computer modeling using MassMotion to determine the factor of safety available for occupants 
to evacuate. This section of the report concludes the analysis portion of this report. The following Section 
6 of this report is a fire safety management plan intended to be handed off as a separate document to 
facilities or the building owner for maintenance and upgrade purposes in the future.  
6. FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT PLAN 
 
 This Section of the report is intended to be the fire safety management plan which this Section 
alone could be handed off to the owner or someone in facilities, so they have enough information to comply 
with the ITM requirements for the building. 
Name of Building: Construction Innovation Center (CIC) 
Address/Location of Building: 1 Grand Ave, San Luis Obispo, CA, 93407 
Relevant Codes: 
• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA): 
 
o NFPA 10, Standard for PorTable Fire Extinguishers, 2013 edition 
o NPFA 13, Standard for Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2013 edition 
o NFPA 14, Standard for the installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems, 2013 edition 
o NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire 
Protection Systems, 2011 edition 
o NFPA 72, National Fire alarm and Signaling Code, 2013 edition 
o NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2012 edition 
• International Code Council: 
o International Building Code (IBC), 2015 edition 
o International Fire Code (IFC), 2015 edition 
o International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC), 2015 edition 
 
Occupancy: B  























As shown in APPENDIX U & V as built drawings 
Building Construction Type: Type IIB 
o No Fire resistance rating required for building elements (IBC Table 601). 
o Fire Resistance rating is required for some building elements. These are shown in 
Appendix S 
Building Height: 
- Top of Roof: 46ft 
- Highest Level of Occupancy: 28ft 
Egress: 
- Emergency lighting: 
o Emergency power for lighting required IBC §1008.3 
- Exit Signs: 
o Required in Accordance to IBC §1013 
Fire Alarm: 
- Proprietary Supervising Station Alarm System 
o Monitored by the Cal Poly Campus Police Department 
- Fire Alarm Control Panel Location: 
o Building A – Room A110 
o Building B & C – Room B110 
- Smoke detection provided 
o Smoke Detection is provided but it is not required by code 
Sprinkler System: 
- Wet Pipe Automatic Sprinkler System  
- Viking Microfast Quick Response Sprinklers 
- NFPA 13 Hazard Classifications:  
o Light Hazard – Office and General Buildings Areas 
o Ordinary Hazard – Mechanical, Service, Storage, and Laboratory Rooms 
PorTable Extinguisher: 






- Are required to be installed throughout the building.  
- See Appendix U & V for Extinguisher locations. 
- Below are tabulated requirements. 
 Light Hazard Ordinary Hazard 
Min Rate single Extinguisher 
2-A, or two water-type 
extinguishers each with a 1-A 
rating will be deemed equivalent 
of one 2-A rated extinguisher 
 
2-A 
Max Floor area per unit of A 3,000sqft 1,500sqft 
Max Floor area for extinguisher 11,250sqft 










6.1. Building Owner Responsibilities 
 The building owner is responsible for a variety of different things. A summarized list of the building 
owner responsibilities is shown below. 
1. Building owner will be responsible to maintain the fire and life safety systems in an operable 
condition at all times (IFC §907.8.5) 
2. Building owner is responsible for maintaining Fire Evacuation Plans & Fire Safety Plans (IFC 
§404) and reviewing/updating plans annually or necessitated by changes in staff assignments, 
occupancy or the physical arrangement of the building. 
a. Items required of these plans are summarized in later Sections of report and include a 
multitude of responsibilities. 
3. Employee training 
a. Building owner is responsible for providing employees with the following:  
i. Fire prevention training 
ii. Evacuation training 
iii. Fire safety training 
b. These items are detailed in a later Section of the report. 
4. Emergency Evacuation Drills (Fire Drills) 
a. Building owner is responsible for conducting them. For details see the Section of this report 
for emergency evacuation drills 
5. Copy of fire safety plan on each floor 
6. Notify fire code official of changes in fire safety plan 
6.1.1. Fire safety and evacuation plans (IFC §404) 
  This Section of the report provides the fire safety and evacuation plans for the CIC. 
6.1.1.1. Fire Evacuation Plan (IFC §404.2.1) 
 In the event of a fire or fire alarm all occupants should. 
1. Safely stop their work. 
2. Call 911 to notify the authorities (Fire Department) 
3. Activate the fire alarm via a manual pull station if not already activated. 
4. Leave the building through the nearest exit as indicated on Emergency Evacuation Route Map. 
a. Employees and/or Professors will help occupants unable to use the stairs unassisted. 
i. In accordance to training procedures 
b. Do NOT use Elevators for Evacuation 
5. Report to your designated assembly area. 
6. Wait for instructions from emergency responders 
Occupants during evacuation  
- DO NOT use elevators for evacuation 
- DO NOT re-enter the building until the fire department has cleared the building and has 
instructed that the building can be re-occupied. 
 
The goal of 2 and 3 above is to notify the authorities so they can respond. The reason for item 5 is so 
occupants will be accounted for and deemed as safe once they reach the designated assembly area.  
 
Elevators within the CIC are not designed for evacuation.  






 The fire alarm system is a Proprietary Supervising Station Alarm System monitored on campus 
by the Cal Poly Campus Police Department. It is the responsibility of the Cal Poly Police department 
immediately upon activation of the fire alarm system to notify the fire department. 
 A method for communication between the Simpson Strong Tie (SST) building and the CIC will 
be established for notifying occupants in the adjacent building if a fire and/or fire alarm occurs. This is an 
added measure of safety to account for the close proximity of the SST to the CIC and the event in which a 
fire occurs in the SST which could affect evacuation in building B of the CIC. 
 
6.1.1.2. Fire Safety Plans (IFC §404.2.2) 
 The Fire Safety plans outlined in this Section of the report will be reviewed and/or updated annually 
or as necessitated by changes in staff assignments, occupancy, or physical arrangement of the building (IFC 
§404.3). 
 Cal Poly will be responsible for identifying and assigning personnel that are responsible for 
maintenance of systems and equipment installed to prevent or control fires as well as maintenance, 
housekeeping and controlling fuel hazard sources. The department within Cal Poly that generally holds 
these responsibilities is the Facilities department or Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) department.  
 Since the CIC utilizes stairways as the means of egress for floors that are above the grade plan. A 
procedure will be required to be developed in a joint effort from Cal Poly and the manufacture of the 
selected product used to evacuated occupants who cannot descend stairs unassisted.  
 Several sets of drawings are required to be on hand that involve fire safety and evacuation. These 
drawings are provided in the as built drawings of the building. The applicable plans are as follows. 
1. Site plans showing: Appendix W  
a. Assembly Points 
b. Fire Hydrants 
c. Fire Department Access Roads 
2. Floors plans showing: Appendix U & V 
a. Location of exits 
b. Primary evacuation routes 
c. Secondary evacuation routes 
d. Manual fire alarm boxes locations 
e. Portable fire extinguisher locations 
f. Fire alarm annunciators and controls 
In addition to the drawings required for the building a list is required to be created summarizing the major 
fire hazards associated with the normal use and occupancy of the premises, including maintenance and 
housekeeping procedures. This list is summarized below. 
1. Simpson Strong Tie Building 
a. This is a fire hazard not directly associated with the CIC, but due to the proximity of the 
Simpson Strong Tie building it is worth including. To limit the possible fire exposure from 
projects within the STT building hazardous materials within the SST should be limited to 
that for use of project and should limit the use of flammable and combustible liquids. 
2. Janitor Closest. 






a. The chemicals within the janitor closets throughout the building hold a fire hazard due to 
the flammability characteristics of some of the chemicals that are normally storage in such 
rooms. It should be ensured that these chemicals to not exceed the maximum allowable 
quantity permitted for the occupancy.  
3. General Storage rooms in office part of building and materials associated with occupancy. 
a. The general storage rooms and/or copy rooms within building A of the CIC could contain 
a decent number of flammable materials associated with office storage rooms and office 
supplies. 
4. Projects in lab rooms 
a. During a walkthrough of the building, I noticed that in some of the laboratory classrooms 
there are several models/projects on display in the space. These models appear to be made 
of materials that could be highly flammable. If these projects are being created in these 
rooms, it should be ensured that the rooms are kept clean and the number of projects on 
display be limited. 
 
6.1.2. Emergency Evacuation Drills (IFC §405) 
 This Section outlines the requirements for emergency evacuation drills which include fire drills. 
Cal Poly’s Campus Police department along with the facilities or EHS department will be responsible for 
conducting and maintaining records of fire drills unless otherwise documented. Below is an outline of the 
requirements for emergency evacuation and fire drills. 
- Will conducted annually and will include all occupants within the building. 
- Fire Department will be given notification of emergency evacuation drills. 
- Initiation of emergency evacuation drills will be initiated by activating the fire alarm system. 
- Drills will be conducted at unexpected times in varying conditions. 
- Efforts will be made to determine if all occupants have been successfully evacuated or have been 
accounted for. 
- Records will be maintained for: 
o Identity of the person conducting the drill. 
o Date and time of the drill. 
o Notification method used. 
o Employees on duty and participating. 
o Number of occupants evacuated. 
o Special conditions simulated. 
o Problems encountered. 
o Weather conditions when occupants were evacuated. 
o Time required to accomplish complete evacuation. 
 
6.1.3. Employee Training and response procedures (IFC §406) 
 This Section covers the requirements of employee training. Employees are considered all occupants 
where are employed by Cal Poly. In addition, since the Cal Poly campus is so large and there is a number 
of buildings professors teaching classes in this building will be required to undergo the training 
requirements outlined in this Section. The exact means and methods in which the below outlined of training 
is completed is up to the discretion of Cal Poly.  







- Be trained in fire emergency procedures based on Fire evacuation plans and Fire safety plans. 
- Receive training on the fire safety and evacuation plans and their duties as part of new employee 
orientation and not less than annually thereafter. 
o Records of training will be maintained. 
- Be apprised of the fire hazards of the materials and processes to which they are exposed.  
- Be instructed in the proper procedures for preventing fires in the conduct of their assigned duties. 
- Be familiarized with the fire alarm and evacuation signals, their assigned duties in the event of an 
alarm or emergency, evacuation routes, areas of refuge, exterior assembly areas and procedures for 
evacuation. 
- Employees assigned fire-fighting duties will be trained to know the locations and proper use of 
portable fire extinguishers or other manual fire-fighting equipment and the protective clothing or 
equipment required for its safe and proper use. 
 
6.1.4. Inspection Testing and Maintenance (ITM) 
This Section of the report outlines the general ITM requirements for the fire protection systems. 
6.1.4.1. Fire Alarm 
The ITM requirements from NFPA 72 are in Chapter 14 of the code. All equipment of a fire alarm 
system when first installed is required to have an initial acceptance inspection and test. After the initial 
acceptance inspection and testing are required to be performed at a periodic frequency. Each component of 
the fire alarm system has a different interval (time between last inspection and testing). The visual 
inspection frequencies are shown in Table 14.3.1 of NFPA 72. A List of the applicable Sections of the Table 
are shown below.  
• Table 14.3.1 visual inspection applicable Sections 
o 1. All equipment. 
o 2. Control Equipment. 
o 5. In-Building Fire Emergency voice/alarm communications equipment. 
o 9. Batteries. 
o 17. Initiating devices. 
o 22. Notification appliances. 
o 23. Exit marking audible notification appliances. 
o 27. Supervising station alarm systems – receivers. 
The testing interval of requirements in NFPA 72 can be found in Table 14.4.3.2. The applicable Sections 
of the Table 14.4.3.2 for the CIC system are listed below. 
• Table 14.4.3.2 Testing 
o 1. All equipment. 
o 2. Control equipment and transponder. 
o 3. Fire alarm control unit trouble signals. 
o 4. Supervising station alarm systems – transmission equipment. 
o 7. Secondary (standby) power supply. 
o 9. Battery tests. 
o 15. Conductors – metallic. 






o 16. Conductors – nonmetallic. 
o 17. Initiating devices. 
o 22. Alarm notification appliances. 
The frequencies of these testing and inspection requirements vary greatly and can become detail 
specific on the system installed. An example is the battery used as secondary power for the FACP. The 
testing and inspection requirements vary greatly for the type of battery installed. 
The testing requirements of smoke detectors are required to be in accordance with Sections 
14.4.4.3.1 through 14.4.4.3.7 of NFPA 72. Some of the requirements that stand out are that the smoke 
detectors within the CIC are required to be tested within 5 years (NFPA 72 14.4.4.5.4) where at least two 
or more detectors are required to be tested on each initiating circuit annually (NFPA 72 Section 14.4.4.5.1). 
The testing is to ensure that the detectors are calibrated properly and have the correct sensitivity.  
The maintenance of the fire alarm system falls under the requirements of NFPA 72 Section 14.5. 
This Section requires that the system be maintained in accordance with the manufacture’s published 
instructions (Section 14.5.2) and that the frequency of maintenance is dependent on local ambient 
conditions (Section 14.5.3) 
Records of ITM are required to be kept in accordance with NFPA 72 Section 14.6.2. Records are 
required to be kept until the next test and a year thereafter. The records are required to be on a medium that 
will survive the retention period (paper or electronic is permitted). Finally, a record of all inspection, testing, 
and maintenance is required to be provided in accordance with NFPA 72 Section 7.8.2 which provides 
documentation/forms that can be filled out. 
 
6.1.4.2. Sprinkler system 
NFPA 25 requires that the property owner or a designated representative is responsible for properly 
maintaining the water-based fire protection systems within the building. NFPA 25 also requires that no 
changes in occupancy, use or process or materials used or stored in building without evaluation of the fire 
protection systems capabilities. Changing the occupancy or the hazard associated with the space could 
affect the protection requirements needed to protect the space. The worst-case scenario is the hazard is 
increased and the water-based fire protection system will become inadequate to protect the space with the 
increased hazard. 
The minimum required frequencies for ITM can be found in NFPA 25 Table 5.1.1.2 (Appendix Q) 
for sprinkler systems and in Table 13.1.12 (Appendix Q) for common components and valves. Some general 
requirements for ITM of sprinkler systems are discussed below. For all the possible applicable requirements 
refer to NFPA 25. 
Where sprinklers are required to be inspected from the floor level annually any of the following 
requires that the sprinkler be replaced. 
1. Corrosion detrimental to sprinkler performance 
2. Physical damage 
3. Loss of fluid in the glass bulb heat-responsive element 
4. Loading detrimental to sprinkler performance 
5. Paint other than that applied by the sprinkler manufacturer. 






If sprinklers are found to be in the incorrect orientation, they are required to be corrected by 
repositioning the branch line or replacing the drop or sprig. Sprinklers installed in concealed spaces such 
as above suspended ceilings do not require inspection.   
 Once sprinklers have been in service for 50 years the sprinklers will be required to be replaced or 
submitted to a recognized testing laboratory acceptable to authority having jurisdiction for testing. If the 
sprinklers are continued to be used the testing procedure is required to be repeated at 10-year intervals and 
once they have been in service for 75 years, the testing interval is required to be every 5 years. 
 Sprinklers that have been removed from the system for any reason will not be reinstalled. For 
further information on the replacement of existing sprinklers see §5.4 of NFPA 25 for more requirements. 
The building owner or designated represenative is required to designate an impairment coordinator 
to comply with the requirements of §15 of NFPA 25. This Section also requires that the impairment 
coordinator implements a plan for emergency impairments (§15.6) as well as preplanned impairments 
(§15.5). Once the system has been repaired the impariment coordinator is required to follow the procedures 
outlined in §15.7. Whenever a component in a sprinkler system is adjusted, repaired, reconditioned, or 
replaced, the actions required in NFPA 25 Table 5.5.1 and 13.11.1 are required where applicable. These 
actions do not require a design review outside of the scope of NFPA 25.  
During inspection where pipe blockage is suspected in the fire protection system see §14 of NFPA 
25 for the minimum requirements for conduction investigations for possible sources of materials that could 
cause the pipe blockage. 
 
6.1.4.3. Emergency and Standby Power Systems 
a. Inspection, Testing and Maintenance (ITM) of emergency and standby power systems will 
be in accordance with NFPA 110 and NFPA 111 such that the system is capable of 
supplying service within the time specified for the type and duration required. 
b. Emergency lighting equipment 
i. An activation test of emergency lighting equipment will be completed monthly for 
a duration not less than 30 seconds. 
6.1.4.4. Fire-Resistance-Rated Construction 
a. Fire resistance rating of fire rated construction will be maintained (IFC §703.1) 
b. See Appendix S with labeling of fire resistive members 
c. Fire resistance construction elements will be visually inspected annually 
i. Where elements concealed, they are not required to be inspected by owner 
6.1.4.5. Fire Department Connections 
a. Immediate access to fire department connections will be maintained at all times and 
without obstruction by fences, bushes, trees, walls or any other fixed or moveable object 
(IFC §912.4) 
b. ITM in accordance with NFPA 25 §13.7 and Table 13.1 
6.1.4.6. Hydrants 
a. Unobstructed access to hydrants will be maintained at all times. Fire department will not 
be deterred or hindered from gaining access to fire protection equipment or hydrants (IFC 
§407.5.4). 






b. A 3ft clear space will be maintained around the circumference of fire hydrants, except as 
otherwise required or approved (IFC §507.5.5). 
6.1.4.7. Egress (IFC § 1031) 
a. Exit accesses, exits, and exit discharges will be continuously maintained free from 
obstructions or impediments to full instant use.  
6.1.4.8. Fire Department Access 
a. Fire Access Route as seen in drawings will be kept clear at all times. The Fire Access 










7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 This report reviewed the prescriptive and performance-based analysis for the fire protection and 
life safety of the CIC along with providing a Fire Safety Management Plan. The building was found to meet 
most of the criteria it was compared against with some exceptions coming from the prescriptive portion of 
this report. The results of the performance-based portion of this report met the failure criteria, however 
more analysis will be required for the design fires not modeled with FDS.    
 The CIC was found to comply with most of the prescriptive requirements from the 2015 edition of 
the International Building Code when looking at egress, flammability, structural fire protection 
requirements, fire alarm, and suppression. Several code related items need to be verified or investigated 
further. The simplest is more analysis or testing for sound level requirements of the notification system 
within building A. This could be simply resolved by added another horn to the fire alarm notification circuit.  
The most complex problem to be resolved would be verification that the provisions of the 2007 California 
Building Code are met. This needs to be verified as the additions of the SHB was added using a different 
edition of the California Building Code from which the CIC was built. The CIC would need to be verified 
that it either meets the requirements of the 2007 California Building Code or the SHB and the CIC would 
need to be updated to meet the requirements of a newer/current edition of the building code.  
 Indications that there could be problems spur from drawings obtained of the SHB. The drawings 
indicated the fire alarm system of the SHB are independent and do not communicate with the CIC. This 
can be verified by contacting Cal Poly or obtaining updated as built drawings of the CIC (if there are any) 
or the as built drawings of the SHB (again if there are any). 
 The performance-based analysis reviewed 4 design fires. The design fires included a lecture room, 
a corridor in Building A, a conference room in building A, and the SHB. A final heat release rate curve was 
found for all of the design fires, but only the SHB design fire was modeled in detail. The remaining three 
design fires were only analyzed with hand calculations which would need further analysis to verify the 
results. Some of this future modeling would likely include FDS and SAFIR modeling for the structural fires 
along with tenability and evacuation modeling. The lecture room, corridor, and conference room design 
fires were discussed in enough detail in which FDS modeling would be relatively simple. 
 The design fire in the SHB was selected to determine the effects on the occupants of building B of 
the CIC. Hand Calculations were performed for the structural analysis and little effect was found on the 
exposed unprotected exterior I-beams of building B. Computer modeling using FDS was then used to 
compare to the tenability criteria selected (temperature, heat flux, CO concentration, and visibility). At 1238 
seconds the tenability criteria for visibility were found to be exceeded on the third-floor walkway. No other 
tenability criteria were found to have been exceeded. Thus, resulting in the ASET being greater than the 
RSET with a factor of safety of 1.8. Further modeling and analysis could be performed on this design fire 
by varying the ventilation, location, HRR curve/peak/size, and material composition within the SHB. As 
well throughout this design fire in the computer model the glass in the SHB was assumed to be broken, 
more research could be done to verify how glass breaks. This may not be required as it could provide for 
more favorable conditions for occupants if there is a delay in the glass breaking in the SHB. This could be 
verified by allowing an opening the model to occur after a set point in time to observe the affects.  
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B. APPENDIX - OCCUPANT LOAD CALCULATION 
RESULTS 
Building A Basement Accessory Storage Area 
Room Square Footage Occupancy Per Space Number of Exits Width Of exits [ft] 
A001 Electrical Room 198 1 1 3 
A002 Trans Rm 495 2 1 8 
A003 Pump Room 945 4 1 3 
A004 MPOE Room 62 1 1 3 
Corridor entrance area 558 2 1   
TOTAL SQ 2258 10     
 













Width of exit 
factor (inches) 
Required 




A101 Conference Room 610 7 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A102 Dept Office 200 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A103 Dept Head Asst 122 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A104 CM Office 114 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A106 CM office 114 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A105 CM office 114 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A106 CM Mail/Work Area 285 3 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A100A Seating 326 4 100 1 1 0.15 32 6 
A100 Reception 325 4 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A110 Storage 84 1 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A109 Bathroom 100 1 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A108 Privately Funded 
FAC research 
228 3 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
CORRIDOR 725 8 100 1 1 0.15 32   
TOTAL  3347 41             
 













Width of exit 
factor (inches) 
Required 




A201 CM Office 101 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A201 CM Office  110 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A202 CM Office 110 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A203 Conference 
Room 
453 5 100 1 1 0.15 32 6 
A204 CM Office 115 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A205 CM Office 115 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A206 CM Office 115 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A207 CM Office 116 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A209 CM Office 146 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A211 Recruiting 125 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A212 Bathroom 60 1 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A213 CM 
recruiting 
120 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A214 Presentation 
lab 
249 3 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A216 IDF Room 60 1 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
CORRIDOR 725 8 100 1 1 0.15 32   
Outside exit 
walkway 
1664 17 100 1 1 0.15 32   
TOTAL 4384 55             
































A314 CM Office 122 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A313 Closet 62 1 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A300 DBL Office 169 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A301 CM Office 121 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A302 CM Office 115 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A303 CM office 149 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A304 CM Office 132 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A305 CM Office 104 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A306 CM Office 98 1 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A307 CM Office 122 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A309 CM Office 126 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A311a Storage 58 1 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A311 Copy/Fax Break Room 118 2 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
A312 Bathroom 69 1 100 1 1 0.15 32 3 
CORRIDOR 408 5 100 1 1 0.15 32   
Outside patio Area 572 6 100 1 1 0.15 32   
Exit corridor outside building 1036 11 100 1 1 0.15 32   
TOTAL 3581 46             
 
 
Building A Education Classroom Occupancy 1st floor 






Number of Exits 
Drawings 
Number of Exits 
Width of exit factor 
(inches) 
Required Width 





1913 39 50 1 1 0.15 32 3 
Total 1913     1         
 















Width of exit factor 
(inches) 
Required 




A215 CM Lab working 
space 
1998 40 50 1 2 0.15 32 4.916667 
Total 1998               
 
  



























Drawings width [ft] 
B102 CM Lab Working Space 1897 38 50 1 1 0.15 32 4.91 
B103 CM Lab Working Space 1994 40 50 1 2 0.15 32 4.91 
B106 CM Lab Working Space 1989 40 50 1 2 0.15 32 4.91 
B105 Privately Funded FAC Research 235 5 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
B104 Privately Funded FAC Research 235 5 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
TOTAL 6350 128             
 




















Drawings width [ft] 
B202 Computer Lab 1902 39 50 1 1 0.15 32 4.91 
B203 CM Lab Lecture Format 1986 40 50 1 2 0.15 32 4.91 
B206 CM Lab Lecture Format 1989 40 50 1 2 0.15 32 4.91 
B205 Privately Funded FAC 
Research 
235 5 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
B204 Privately Funded FAC 
Research 
235 5 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
TOTAL 6347 129             
 






















B302 Arch 01A 1894 38 50 1 1 0.15 32 4.91 
B303 CM 07 2215 45 50 1 2 0.15 32 4.91 
B304 ARCH 01B 1861 38 50 1 2 0.15 32 3 
ADDED ROOM Privately Funded FAC 
Research 
235 5 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
Added Room Privately Funded FAC 
Research 
235 5 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
TOTAL 6440 131             
 





















C100 LEC Large 728 37 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
C101 LEC Large 722 37 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
C102 LEC Large 721 37 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
C103 LEC Large 525 27 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
TOTAL 2696 138             
 
  





























C203 LEC Medium Group 759 38 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
C202 LEC Medium 583 30 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
C201 LEC Medium 585 30 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
C200 572 29 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
TOTAL 2499 127             
 
 






















C303 LEC Medium 
Group 
759 38 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
C302 LEC Medium 
Group 
742 38 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
C301 LEC Medium 583 30 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
C300 LEC Medium 558 28 20 1 1 0.15 32 3 
TOTAL 2642 134             
 
  






C. APPENDIX - OCCUPANT LOAD CALCULATION 
RESULTS WITH DRAWINGS 
 
 












































D. APPENDIX - REMOTENESS OF EXIT MARK UPS AND 
STAIRWAY WIDTH MARKUPS 
 




























E. APPENDIX - DATA SHEETS FOR THE FIRE ALARM 
CONTROL PANEL 































































F. APPENDIX - SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS (SOO) FROM 
DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS 




















G. APPENDIX - DATA SHEETS FOR THE DETECTION 
DEVICES 
 










































H. APPENDIX - FIRE ALARM DRAWINGS MARK-UP 
 
  
































































































































J. APPENDIX - DATA SHEETS FOR THE NOTIFICATION 
DEVICES 
 































K. APPENDIX - APPLICABLE CODE SECTIONS FOR 
NOTIFICATION APPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS 
18.4.3* Public Mode Audible Requirements.  
18.4.3.1* To ensure that audible public mode signals are clearly heard, unless otherwise permitted 
by 18.4.3.2 through 18.4.3.5, they shall have a sound level at least 15 dB above the average ambient 
sound level or 5 dB above the maximum sound level having a duration of at least 60 seconds, 
whichever is greater, measured 5 ft (1.5 m) above the floor in the area required to be served by the 
system using the A-weighted scale (dBA). 
 
18.4.8 Location of Audible Notification Appliances for Building or Structure. 18.4.8.1 If ceiling 
heights allow, and unless otherwise permitted by 18.4.8.2 through 18.4.8.5, wall-mounted 
appliances shall have their tops above the finished floors at heights of not less than 90 in. (2.29 m) 
and below the finished ceilings at distances of not less than 6 in. (150 mm). 
18.4.8.3 If combination audible/visible appliances are installed, the location of the installed 
appliance shall be determined by the requirements of 18.5.5. 
 
18.5 Visible characteristics – Public Mode 
18.5.5.1* Wall-mounted appliances shall be mounted such that the entire lens is not less than 80 
in. (2.03 m) and not greater than 96 in. (2.44 m) above the finished floor or at the mounting height 
specified using the performance-based alternative of 18.5.5.6. 























L. APPENDIX - AUDIBILITY CALCULATION USING 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































M. APPENDIX - SECONDARY POWER SUPPLY 










N. APPENDIX - SPRINKLER SHOP DRAWINGS WITH 
HIGHLIGHTED PIPPING 
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SCOPE OF \v'DRK 
1. CALIFORNIA CENTRAL PROTECTION <C-CO) SHALL PROVIDE A \./ET-PIPE AUTOMATIC
SPRINKLER SYSTEM IN CONFORMANCE \./ITH NFPA #13, 1999 EDITION, AND
THE 2001 CALIFORNIA BUILDING CODE AND DSA/SS AMENDMENTS.
2. CALIFORNIA CENTRAL FIRE PROTECTION \./ORK STARTS AT AN 8' FLANGE INSIDE
BUILDING 'A', THE FIRE SERVICE CONNECTION AND UNDERGROUND PIPING
ARE EXCLUDED FROM THIS SCOPE OF \./ORK,
3. FIRE EXTINGUISHERS AND CABINETS, ELECTRICAL \./ORK, AND ANY PAINTING
OF PIPING OR HANGERS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THIS SCOPE OF \./ORK,
4, SECTIONAL CONTROL ASSEMBLIES SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR EACH BUILDING 
SEE DETAILS ON SHEETS FP2.00 AND FP2.05. 
5, ALL ELECTRICAL DEVICES PROVIDED BY ALLIED FIRE PROTECTION <AFP) \./ILL 
BE \./IRED 'BY OTHERS'. 
GENERAL NOTES 
1. ALL MATERIALS AND DEVICES SHALL BE U,L, LISTED AND IN CONFORMANCE \./ITH
NFPA #13, 1999 EDITION. ELECTRICAL DEVICES SHALL BE LISTED \./ITH THE
CALIFORNIA STATE FIRE MARSHAL FOR USE IN SPRINKLER SYSTEMS,
2, ALL HANGERS SHALL BE SPACED PER NFPA #13 AND CONFORM TD THE 
DETAILS ON THIS DRA\./ING, 
3, ALL S\./AY BRACING SHALL BE PER NFPA #13, 1999 EDITION, SEE SEISMIC BRACING 
CALCULATIONS ATTACHED TO THIS SUBMITTAL, SEE DETAILS THIS DRA\./ING, 
NOTE, \./HERE LINES AND CROSSMAINS ARE SUPPORTED BY SHORT RODS PER NFPA #13, 
<1999) SECTION 6-4,5,3 EXCEPTION NO, 2, LATERAL BRACING IS NOT REQUIRED. 
4. PIPE,
A, ALL SCRE\./ED PIPING SHALL BE SCHEDULE 40 BLACK STEEL IN CONFORMANCE
\./ITH ASTM A-135, 
B. ALL ROLLED-GROOVED PIPING SHALL BE SCHEDULE 10 BLACK STEEL IN
CONFORMANCE \./ITH ASTM A-135,
5, FITTINGS• 
A, SCRE\./ED FITINGS SHALL BE STANDARD MALLEABLE OR CAST IRON IN 
CONFORMANCE \./ITH ANSI B16.3 AND ANSI B16.4. 
B. GROOVED FITTINGS AND COUPLINGS SHALL BE GRINNELL FIGURE 772 RIGID,
AND STYLE 705 FLEXIBLE, RATED 300 PSI <MIN).




A. MECHANICAL AND SERVICE ROOMS ARE ORDINARY HAZARD GROUP 1 CLASSIFICATION,
CALCULATED TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF 0.15 GPM / SQ FT OVER THE
HYDRAULICALLY MOST DEMANDING AREA USING QUICK RESPONSE SPRINKLERS,
DESIGN AREA TD BE DETERMINED BASED UPON CEILING HEIGHT PER SEC. 7-2.3.2.4.
A 250 GPM SIMULTANEOUS HOSE STREAM ALLD\./ANCE SHALL BE
INCLUDED AT THE CONNECTION TO THE SITE \./ATER MAIN ('SOURCE').
B, STORAGE ROOMS ARE ORDINARY HAZARD GROUP 1 CLASSIFICATION, CALCULATED 
TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF 0.15 GPM / SQ FT OVER THE HYDRAULICALLY 
MOST DEMANDING AREA USING QUICK RESPONSE SPRINKLERS, DESIGN AREA SHALL 
DETERMINED BASED UPON CEILING HEIGHT PER SEC. 7-2.3,2.4, 
A 250 GPM SIMULTANEOUS HOSE STREAM ALLD\./ANCE SHALL BE
INCLUDED AT THE CONNECTION TO THE SITE \./ATER MAIN ('SOURCE'). 
C. OFFICE AND GENERAL BUILDING AREAS ARE LIGHT HAZARD CLASIFICA TIDN,
CALCULATED TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF 0.10 GPM / SQ FT OVER THE
MOST DEMANDING AREA USING QUICK RESPONSE SPRINKLERS. THE DESIGN AREA
TD BE DETERMINED BASED UPON CEILING HEIGHT PER SEC. 7-2.3.2.4.
A 100 GPM SIMULTANEOUS HOSE STREAM ALLO\./ANCE SHALL BE
INCLUDED AT THE CONNECTION TD THE SITE \./ATER MAIN ('SOURCE'),
D. LABORATORY AREAS ARE ORDINARY HAZARD GROUP 1 CLASSIFICATION, AND
SHALL BE CALCULATED TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF 0.15 GPM / SQ FT OVER
THE HYDRAULICALLY MOST DEMANDING AREA, THE DESIGN AREA TO BE BASED
UPON CEILING HEIGHT PER SEC, 7-2.3.2.4,
A 250 GPM HOSE STREAM ALLO\./ANCE SHALL BE INCLUDED AT THE CONNECTION
INCLUDED AT THE CONNECTION TD THE SITE \./ATER MAIN ('SOURCE'),
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GENERAL NOTES (CONTINUED) 
7, ALL NE\./ PIPING SHALL BE TESTED HYDROSTATICALLY AT 50 PSI ABOVE MAXIMUM 
STATIC PRESSURE, DR 200 PSI, \./HICHEVER IS GREATER FDR T\./0 HOURS IN THE 
PRESENCE OF THE FIRE MARSHAL. 
8 ALL PIPE PENETRATIONS OF RATED \./ALLS, PARTITIONS OR OCCUPANCY 
SEPARATIONS SHALL BE FIRE STOPPED. SEE MATERIALS SUBMITTAL FOR DETAILS, 
9. SPRINKLERS,
A. AREAS \./ITH EXPOSED STRUCTURE CEILINGS ARE VIKING MICRDFAST MODEL 'M'
QUICK RESPONSE STANDARD SPRINKLERS, K=5,6, 155 DEG. F. TEMP, RA'fING,
UNLESS NOTED, PLAIN BRASS FINISH.
B. STANDARD SIDE\./ALL SPRINKLERS ARE VIKING MICROFAST <VK305) QUICK
RESPONSE H□RIZOTNAL SIDE\./ALL SPRINKLERS, K=5,6, 155 DEG, F,
TEMPERATURE RATING, PLAIN BRASS FINISH.
C. SPRINKLERS ON ALL SUSPENDED CEILINGS EXCEPTED AS NOTED ARE
VIKING QUICK RESPONSE MODEL B-2 CONCEALED SPRINKLERS <VK404), K=5,6,
162 DEG, F. TEMPERATURE RATING, PLAIN BRASS, \./ITH \./HITE COVER PLATE,
D. SPRINKLERS ON SUSPENDED CEILINGS SERVICE AREAS ARE VIKING MICROFAST
MODEL 'M' QUICK RESPONSE STANDARD SPRINKLERS, K=5.6, 155 DEG. F,
TEMPERATURE RATING, BRASS FINISH, \./ITH \./HITE T\./0-PIECE ESCUTCHEON.
10, ALL ELEVATORS ARE CLASSIFIED AS PASSENGER AND CONFORM TO ASME A17.l, 
SPRINKLERS NOT REQUIRED AT THE TOP OF THE HOISTWAY PER SECTION 
5-13.6.3, EXCEPTION. ELEVATORS DD NOT USE COMBUSTIBLE HYDRAULIC 
FLUID, A SPRINKLER AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SHAFT IS NOT REQUIRED PER 
SECTION 5-13,6.1, EXCEPTION. 
11. ALL BUILDING SHAFTS ARE EXEMPT FROM SPRINKLER PROTECTION PER NFPA #13,
SECTION 5-13,2.1 (EXCEPTION #1 AND #2).
DSA GENERAL NOTES: 
1. NFPA 13 (99) SEC. 10-2.l UNDERGROUND MAINS AND LEAD-IN CONNECTIONS TD SYSTEM
RISER SHALL BE COMPLETELY FLUSHED BEFORE CONNECTION IS MADE TO THE OVERHEAD
SPRINKLER SYSTEM, (WITNESSED BY THE INSPECTOR OF RECORD.)
2. NFPA 13 (99) SEC. 10-2,2.l ALL INTERIOR PIPING AND APPURTENANCES SUBJECTED TO
WORKING PRESSURE SHALL BE HYDR□STATICALLY TESTED AT 200 PSI AND SHALL
MAil'.:TAIN THAT PRESSURE WITHOUT LOSS FOR 2 HOURS. (WITNESSED BY THE INSPECTOR
OF RECORD.) LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED OF DATE AND TESTING SO
THEY MAY OBSERVE TESTING,
3, NFPA 13 (96) SEC. 2-2,8 PROVIDE SPARE SPRINKLER HEAD CABINET, SPRINKLER \JRENCH, 
AND MAINTAIN NO FEVER THAN A TOTAL OF 6 SPARE SPRINKLERS MATCHING THE TYPES 
AND TEMPERATURE RATINGS IN EACH BUILDING FDR SYSTEMS LESS THAN 300 SPRINKLERS. 
4. NFr1\ 13 <99) SEC. 6-4.6 PROVIDE RESTRAINT OF BRANCH LINES BY USE OF ONE OF
FOLLOWING,
(A) A LISTED S\JAY BRACE ASSEMBLY 
(B) A \JRAPAR□UND U-HOOK SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF 6-4.5.3, EXCEPTION ND. 3
(C) NO, 12 440 LB \JIRE INSTALLED AT LEAST 45 DEGREES FROM THE VETRTICAL
PLANE AND ANCHORED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PIPE.
(D) CALIFORNIA CENTRAL FIRE PROTECTION Ell AND EL2 PROPRIETARY RESTRAINT SYSTEM,
5. NFPA 72 (99) SEC. 2-6.2 SPRINKLER FLOW S\JITCH SHALL BE TESTED BY l□R TD CONFIRM
THAN \JHEN THE INSPECTOR'S TEST VALVE IS ACTIVATED AN ALARM \JILL SOUND ND
LE�$ THAN 20 SECONDS AND NOT MORE THAN 90 SECONDS.
6. NFPA 13 (99) SEC. 5-15.1 FLOW S\JITCH SHALL BE CONNECTED TO A 10 INCH OUTSIDE ALARM
BEL'_ AT EACH RISER. APPROVED IDENTIFICATION SIGN SHALL BE PROVIDED FDR OUTSIDE
ALARM BELL 'SPRINKLER FIRE ALARM - \JHEN BELL RINGS CALL 911/FIRE DEPARTMENT.
7. NFP>. 13 (99) SEC. 10-5 FIGURE A-10-5 HYDRAULIC CALCULATIONS DESIGN DATA PLACARD
SHALL BE ATTACHED TD RISER.
8. NFPA 13 (88) SEC. 10-1(3) SPRINKLER CONTRACTOR (C16) SHALL COMPLETE AND SIGN
CONTRACTOR'S MATERIAL AND TEST CERTIFICATE FDR THE OVERHEAD SPRINKLER SYSTEM
USING FORM IN FIGURE 10-l(o.) AND 10-lCb). THIS FORM SHALL BE GIVEN TD THE INSPECTOR 
OF RECORD (!OR) \JHO \JILL TURN-IN FDR DSA RECORDS, 
9. NFPA 13 (99) SEC. 10-2.4.4 THE MAIN DRAIN VAL VE SHALL BE OPENED AND REMAIN OPENED
UNTI'- THE SYSTEM PRESSURE STABILIZES. THE STATIC AND RESIDUAL PRESSURES SHALL BE 
RECORDED ON THE CONTRACTOR'S TEST CERTIFICATE. (\JITNESSED BY THE INSPECTOR OF 
OF RECORD - I□R.)
10, TITLE 19 ARTICLE 906 (o.) A LABEL OF THE SELF -ADHESIVE TYPE SHALL BE PLACED ON THE 
FIRE DEPARTMENT CONNECTION DR ON THE RISER FOR FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS WITH THE 
DATE OF SERVICE AND/DR DATE OF INSTALLATION WAS PERFORMED AND LICENSE NUMBER OF 
PERSON PERFORMING SERVICE \JDRK. 
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HYDRAULIC DESIGN DATA 
CALCULATION NO. A021 CALCULATION NO. 00.CULATION NO. ~•l SIN SPRIHIQ.IR DESCRPOOH fflLE -HAZARD CLASS LH 10H ll TY3131 TYCO TY FRB SID QR ssu OH 
HAZARD CLASS 2 
□ TY3531 TYCO CONCEALED QR CONC LH SYSTEM TYPE WET I TREE l I DENSITY ,15 GPl.4 GP1'4 GP1'4 
CALCULATED I\RoA 1 039 SQ. FT. SQ. FT. SQ. FT. 
MAX IIR SPRINKLER 1951130 SQ. FT. §n. FT. SQ. FT. 
DEMAND +46.7 GP1'40 62.4 PSI GPMO PSI GPMO PSI 
Fl.OW TEST INFO: FlREPUWP: GPMO PSIIDATE:09/ 0.3/ 02 TIME, 14-45 1TI:SIED BY, WD/ZN 
LOCATION: 1-06-05 f37 
ORIFICE SIZE I OF OlJTl n PJTOT PRESS. AllC PRESS RESlD. PRESS. FLOW UNDERGROUND 
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P. APPENDIX - HYDRAULIC CALCULATIONS AND AREAS 
WHERE CALCULATIONS WHERE PERFORMED. 
 
Figure Q.1. Figure of the hydraulic area used for building A and relevant calculations are shown in table D.1 
  






Table Q.1. tabulated hydraulic calculations from excel for figure D.1. 
 










q 22.5 L 8.5 C= 120 Pt 16.1 Pt k= 5.6
T-?? F 0 EL Pe 0.0 Pv q = k * (Pt)^1/2
Q 22.5 T 8.5 pf 0.009 Pf 0.1 Pn Pt=
q 22.6 L 7 C= 120 Pt 16.2 Pt k= 5.6
F 8 EL Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 45.1 T 15 pf 0.032 Pf 0.5 Pn
q 22.9 L 9 C= 120 Pt 16.7 Pt k= 5.6
t-?? F 8 EL Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 67.9 T 17 pf 0.069 Pf 1.2 Pn K= 16.06624963
17.9
1 q 22.5 T-?? L 6.5 C= 120 Pt 16.1 Pt k= 5.6
F 8 EL Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 22.5 T 14.5 pf 0.009 Pf 0.1 Pn
1 q 23.7 T-?? L 6 C= 120 Pt 17.9 Pt k= 5.6
F 8 EL Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 91.6 T 14 pf 0.120 Pf 1.7 Pn
Pt 19.6 K total 20.71167736
1 to 7 q 0.0 T-?? L 5 C= 120 Pt 19.6 Pt k= 0
F 0 EL Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 91.6 T 5 pf 0.120 Pf 0.6 Pn
q 22.5 L 11.5 C= 120 Pt 16.1 Pt k= 5.6
T-?? F 0 EL Pe 0.0 Pv q = k * (Pt)^1/2
Q 22.5 T 11.5 pf 0.034 Pf 0.4 Pn Pt=
6 q 22.8 L 5.333 C= 120 Pt 16.5 Pt k= 5.6
T-?? F 8 Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 45.3 T 13.333 pf 0.125 Pf 1.7 Pn
7 q 22.5 L 4.666667 C= 120 Pt 16.1 Pt k= 5.6
F Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 22.5 T 4.666667 pf 0.034 Pf 0.2 Pn
q L C= Pt 16.3 Pt KBL 5.572395156
F Pe Pv
Q T pf Pf Pn
7 q 23.8 L 4.666667 C= 120.000 Pt 18.2 Pt KBLT 5.572395156
F El Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 69.1 T 4.666667 pf 0.005 Pf 0.0 Pn
q L C= Pt 18.2 Pt KBL Total 16.1716055
F Pe Pv
Q T pf Pf Pn
q 72.6 L 0 C= 120.000 Pt 20.2 Pt k= 16.1716055
t-?? F 0 El Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 164.3 T 0 pf 0.026 Pf 0.0 Pn
to main q 5 T-15 L 39 C= 120.000 Pt 20.2 Pt 0
2 elbow - 7 F 89 37.750 Pe 16.3 Pv








































Figure Q.2. Drawings showing boxed in blue the hydraulic area used for calculations in table D.2 for building B of the CIC 
  
















Pipe Fittings and 
Devices Other Notes
q 19.5 L 13.5 C= 120 Pt 12.1 Pt k= 5.6
F 6 EL Pe 0.0 Pv q = k * (Pt)^1/2
Q 19.5 T 19.5 pf 0.026 Pf 0.5 Pn Pt=
q 19.9 L 14.125 C= 120 Pt 12.6 Pt k= 5.6
F 6 EL Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 39.4 T 20.125 pf 0.097 Pf 2.0 Pn
q 21.4 L 11 C= 120 Pt 14.6 Pt k= 5.6
F 6 EL Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 60.8 T 17 pf 0.216 Pf 3.7 Pn
q 23.9 T?? L 2 C= 120 Pt 18.3 Pt k= 5.6
F 8 EL Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 84.7 T 10 pf 0.399 Pf 4.0 Pn
q L C= Pt 22.3 Pt k= 5.6
F Pe Pv
Q 84.7 T pf Pf 0.0 Pn
KBL 17.96000099
q 0.0 L 7.833333 C= 120 Pt 22.3 k= 0
F EL Pe 0.0
Q 84.7 T 7.833333 pf 0.008 Pf 0.1
q 84.8 C= 120 Pt 22.3 k= 17.96000099
EL Pe
Q 169.6 pf Pf
q 0.0 L 9.375 C= 120 Pt 22.3 k= 0
F EL Pe 0.0
Q 169.6 T 9.375 pf 0.027 Pf 0.3
22.6
q L C= Pt Pt
F Pe Pv
Q T pf Pf Pn
q 19.5 L 10.5 C= 120 Pt 12.1 Pt k= 5.6
F 6 EL Pe 0.0 Pv q = k * (Pt)^1/2
Q 19.5 T 16.5 pf 0.026 Pf 0.4 Pn Pt=
q 19.8 L 11.25 C= 120 Pt 12.6 k= 5.6
F 6 EL Pe 0.0
Q 39.3 T 17.25 pf 0.097 Pf 1.7
q 21.1 T-?? L 9.91 C= 120 Pt 14.2 k= 5.6
F 8 EL Pe 0.0
Q 60.5 T 17.91 pf 0.214 Pf 3.8
q L C= Pt 18.1 Pt Ktotal 14.2294028
F Pe Pv
Q T pf Pf Pn
q 19.5 T-"" L 1.5 C= 120.000 Pt 12.1 Pt k= 5.6
F 8 Pe Pv
Q 19.5 T 9.5 pf 0.026 Pf 0.3 Pn Kbl lower 5.54303882
q 19.6 L 1.5 C= 120 Pt 12.4 Pt k= 5.6
r-?? F 8 EL 0.000 Pe 0.0 Pv
Q 19.6 T pf 0.027 Pf 0.0 Pn
q 0.0 T-?? L 1.5 C= 120 Pt 18.1 k= 5.6
F 8 EL 0.001 Pe 0.0
Q 80.1 T 9.5 pf 0.360 Pf 3.4
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4 to 8
End of furthest branch line
2nd sprinkler on furthest 
branch line
3rd sprinkler on furthest 
branch line
branch line to cross main
Solving for K factor of branch 
line
friction loss from 1st to 2nd 
branch line
3rd branch line calc to T
Top side k factor of branch 
line
solving for flow requirement of 
another side
solving for flow requirement of 
other side based on K factor 
of side
Solving for total K factor of 
3rd branch line
adding in presure and flow 
requirements for 2nd identical 
branch line
friction loss from 2nd to 3rd 
branch line
3rd branch line calc first 
sprinkler






Q. APPENDIX - INSPECTION, TESTING, AND 
MAINTENANCE (ITM) TABLES FROM NFPA 25 THAT 
SUMMARIZE THE FREQUENCIES REQUIRED FOR ITM 
TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NFPA 25 
 





















R. APPENDIX - HIGHLIGHTED STRUCTURAL DRAWINGS 
TO POINT OUT FIRE RESISTANCE THROUGHOUT THE 
BUILDING  
















































S. APPENDIX - HAND CALCULATION FOR LOADS ON 
STRUCTURAL MEMBERS 
 



















Secondary Means of Egress
Exits
Secondary Means of Egress

















V. APPENDIX – AS BUILT FIRE DEPARMENT ACCESS 
PLANS 
 
 

